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This thesis focuses on the Governor of Wisconsin’s Hmong Resettlement
Taskforce that was charged in 2004 with making policy recommendations for the State
about a large resettlement of Hmong refugees. Through participant-observation,
interviews, and document analysis, the process of policy formation by the Taskforce is
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INTRODUCTION
June 2004 saw the start of one of the fastest and most distinctive resettlements of
refugees since the modern U.S. refugee resettlement program began in 1980. That
month, the governor of Wisconsin created an advisory taskforce to provide
recommendations for how the State could prepare for the arrival of the new Hmong
refugees anticipated in this resettlement. This empirical, ethnographic study depicts this
taskforce as a group of cultural agents and its work as a cultural process. This research
builds upon the work of anthropologists and social scientists who have studied the
cultural production of policy formation.
This thesis is divided into four sections:
1. History of the Hmong People in the Context of the U.S. Refugee System.
Resettlement of refugees and associated policies are a continuous challenge
for state governments. By studying the Wisconsin taskforce’s process of
policy formation, we can learn valuable lessons that can be applied to other
resettlements. This is the first known anthropological study to examine a
state’s resettlement policy process.
2. Theoretical Framework. Anthropological research has a long history of
influencing policy. Many early anthropological studies were used to support
government programs and policies aimed at establishing direct administrative
control in colonial settings over native populations. As the focus of
anthropology shifted after World War II, anthropologists began to concentrate
more on policy evaluation. This research was concentrated in three areas: the
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effects of a policy on particular segments of society, reasons for policy failure
or success, and the production of more culturally informed and responsive
programs. However, anthropologists have only recently begun to study
policy-making as a cultural process. This thesis builds upon the work of the
pioneers in this field of anthropological inquiry including Laura Nader, Susan
Wright, and Cris Shore.
3. Research Design. This study, which was conducted between July 2004 and
August 2005, examines how the dominant discourse produced by the
Taskforce evolved. Through participant-observation in the taskforce meetings
in Wisconsin, semi-structured interviews with taskforce members, and
document analysis of the final report, I attempt to reveal the competing
narratives and show why these did not become dominant in the final report.
Through this methodology, I unveil embedded assumptions and constraints in
the taskforce discourse.
4. Data and Analysis. This thesis is not intended to be an evaluation of the
quality of the recommendations made by the Taskforce, nor does it seek to
trace implementation of the proposals made in the final report. Instead, this
study examines and interprets the process of policy formation by the
Taskforce. As such, this section includes a discussion of the dominant
discourse of the Taskforce and the constraints on other potential narratives. I
also will show how the taskforce members define themselves and their
organizations within the policy field.

3

HISTORY OF THE HMONG PEOPLE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE U.S.
REFUGEE SYSTEM
The history of Hmong resettlement in the United States is complicated and tied to the
development of the entire refugee system. To understand the intricacies of the Taskforce
and this incoming resettlement of Hmong, it is necessary to understand how the U.S.
refugee policy functions and the history of Hmong resettlement in the United States.
Each year the United States admits an average of 70 thousand refugees from
around the world for permanent resettlement (Office of Immigration Statistics 2004).
This federally-funded and state-administered program provides cash assistance, medical
assistance, health screening, and social services to recent refugees. A complex publicprivate partnership between national and local affiliates of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the U.S. Department of State, the United Nations,
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and local non-profit organizations
has developed to identify, transport, and provide initial support to these refugees.
U.S. Refugee Definitions
According to the Refugee Act of 1980, a refugee is a person who has fled his or
her country of origin and cannot return because of “past and/or a well-founded fear of
future persecution due to race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion” (1980). People fleeing natural or manmade disasters, such as
famine or tsunami, economic migrants seeking better living conditions, and people who

4
are displaced within their own country who have not crossed an international border are
not eligible for U.S. refugee status.
Asylum-seekers and refugees are different. Refugees are adjudicated overseas
with no judicial review of the overseas determination. Asylum-seekers first reach the
United States, often on visitor or student visas. They then apply for permanent status by
establishing the same “well-founded fear of persecution.” Unlike refugees, they can use
the U.S. court system to appeal the asylum determination (Churgin 1996).
According to a recent Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, there are
approximately 14 million refugees living outside of their home countries, many in
crowded camps in bordering nations (Subcommittee on Immigration 2002) . Civil war,
human rights violations, and repression have all caused mass migrations of peoples
(Keely 1996). In the 1990s, the sudden withdrawal of Cold War funding that fueled
ethnic and political rivalries by giving arms and sanctuary to resistance movements was
suddenly withdrawn from several countries, including Cambodia, Nicaragua and Angola.
This caused state “implosion,” a complete breakdown of a country’s infrastructure. The
chaos and instability left behind caused thousands of people to flee these countries (Keely
1996; Newland 2003). Increasingly, whole groups are driven from their homes by
governments and insurgent groups attempting to depopulate or shift the ethnic, religious
or other composition of an area (Martin 2000). It is people in these types of situations,
such as the “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia or the tribal massacres in Rwanda, that both the
United Nations and the United States consider humanitarian refugees.
In the United States, refugee policy differs from that applied to other types of
immigrants in several ways. First, refugees are authorized to work upon admission.
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After one year, they may apply for permanent residency, a “green card”. Five years after
admission, they are eligible to apply for citizenship (Bureau of Population, Refugee and
Migration 2002). Second, unlike immigrants who must wait until citizenship, qualified
refugees are immediately eligible to apply for all federal assistance programs, including
TANF, food stamps, SSI and social security (Barnett 2002). For example, refugees over
age 65, can immediately begin to collect social security benefits. However, if a refugee
does not qualify for any assistance, the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) in the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services provides funding for Refugee Cash
Assistance and Refugee Medical Assistance, which are administered by the states, for up
to eight months after arrival. Third, refugees differ from (legal) immigrants because they
are admitted on humanitarian grounds, and there is no requirement that they demonstrate
economic self-sufficiency or have a sponsor who guarantees their financial support
(Vialet 2000).
History of US Refugee Admissions Policy
Mass migrations of peoples have always occurred; however, “refugees” are a
creation of the twentieth century state (Malkki 1995). U.S. recognition of refugees as an
issue of concern that requires policy is still relatively new, originating in the aftermath of
World War II. Before that time, refugees were lumped together with immigrants under
U.S. law and subject to the same quota restrictions on admission, based on country of
origin. As a result, many refugees from Nazi Germany were denied asylum because their
country’s immigrant quota had already been met (Foreign Policy Association 1992).
After the war, the United States enacted the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, the first
refugee legislation ever passed by Congress, and admitted 202 thousand refugees to both
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alleviate the waves of refugees pouring out of Eastern Europe and to potentially
embarrass the Soviet Union (Foreign Policy Association 1992). The initial refugee
processing took place overseas, with screening and selection done on foreign soil far
from the United States (Churgin 1996). This same processing structure is still used
today.
During this same period, the international community focused on the failure to
protect victims of Nazi persecution and the looming threat of Stalinist repression, created
what was intended to be a short-term United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees
(UNHCR) to manage the refugee problem in Europe (Newland 2003). Legal and
humanitarian status was first mandated to refugees through the 1951 UN Geneva
Convention and applied only to European nationals. In 1967, a UN protocol extended the
convention to include any forced migrant, anywhere in the world. Together, the
convention and protocol remain the foundation of refugee law and a cornerstone of
international human rights legislation. Mass migrations and refugee situations, of course,
were not confined to post-war Europe and have continued to fall under the scope of UN
concerns. The UNHCR, which started as only a three-year program, celebrated its fiftieth
anniversary in 2001.
The Geneva Convention and 1967 Protocol also became the foundation upon
which the modern US resettlement policy was established in the Refugee Act portion of
the Immigration and Nationalities Act. As part of this act, each year the President, in
consultation with Congress, determines the number of refugees who may be admitted to
the United States during the coming fiscal year. This annual ceiling is divided by the
President among five regions – Africa, East Asia, Europe, Latin America/ Caribbean and
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the Near East/South Asia, usually leaving some slots unallocated for use in emergencies
or spillover. The UNHCR works with the U.S. government to identify those refugees
most in need of urgent resettlement (Patrick 2002). To facilitate this process, the State
Department, in consultation with the Congress, the Department of Homeland Security,
UNHCR and various NGOs, determines a set of "refugee processing priorities" once a
year to respond to changes in the world refugee situation (Foreign Policy Association
1992).
Until the early 1990s, refugee admissions policy in the United States reflected
Cold War aims and tensions. Generally the U.S. welcomed refugees from communist
countries but did not accept refugees from governments friendly with Washington,
despite documented human rights violations (Foreign Policy Association 1992). After
the 1956 Hungarian uprising, the U.S. took in several thousand Hungarian refugees.
Fidel Castro’s rise to power in 1959 prompted the U.S. to accept more than 200 thousand
Cubans over the following three years (Foreign Policy Association 1992). After the
American withdrawal from Vietnam, thousands of refugees were admitted for
resettlement, especially South Vietnamese who had collaborated with the United States.
It was during this phase of the program that Hmong refugees first came to the
United States. Their refugee status resulted from their collaboration with the U.S.
military in what many Hmong call the “Secret War” in the 1970s. Through participation
in the French-Lao resistance to the Japanese occupation of Laos during WWII, the
Hmong had gained the reputation of being fierce guerrilla fighters. During the 1970s,
Hmong guerillas, with training and monetary support from the American CIA, organized
a temporarily effective resistance to the Pathet Lao, the Lao Communist movement.
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However, with the fall of the Royal Lao government to the Pathet Lao in May of 1975,
thousands of Hmong were killed for their cooperation with the American military and for
their guerrilla activities (Miyares 1998). In total, about ten percent of the Laotian
population eventually fled across the Mekong River to refugee camps in Thailand (Yang
2001). By the end of 1975, the Hmong had slowly begun to resettle in the United States
and other countries.
With the end of the Cold War, the context in which the U.S. refugee admissions
program operated dramatically changed. The focus shifted from primarily large groups
concentrated in single international locations, for example refugees from Vietnam, the
former Soviet Union and Cuba, to the admission of smaller numbers of refugees of more
than 65 nationalities and ethnic groups scattered in often remote locations in the world
(U.S. Department of State 2003). Compared with Cold War resettlement, refugees who
have arrived in recent years have had far fewer close family members living in the United
States who are available to provide support and smooth the integration process (Office of
Refugee Resettlement 1998). The combination of significant linguistic diversity, wideranging educational and employment histories of these refugees, and a shortage of
affordable housing has caused resettlement agencies and state refugee systems to adapt to
meet the increasing demands of the program (Bureau of Population 2002).
The U.S. Resettlement System
The U.S. Department of State works alongside the UNHCR and several
international NGOs to identify those refugees who are in most need of permanent
resettlement in a third country. Generally, it is the joint policy and philosophy of all of
these organizations that there are three “durable solutions” to a refugee crisis. The most
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desired outcome is a peaceable repatriation to the country of origin when tensions and
danger have subsided (Foreign Policy Association 1992). However, when this is not
possible, the second preference is for local integration into the country of first asylum to
which the refugee initially fled. This, too, is not always feasible because of volatile
ethnic tensions, or the strain on the infrastructure and resources of the host government
from a large population influx (Russell 2002). The third solution is permanent
resettlement in a third country, especially for refugees who are in urgent need of
protection. Presently, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States all have resettlement
programs. The United States resettles more refugees than all of these other countries
combined, though this still only accounts for one half of one percent of the refugees in
the world (U.S. Department of State 2003). However, when countries of first asylum
where refugees have integrated (the second durable solution), such as Iran, Tanzania, and
Pakistan, are taken into account, the number of refugees resettled in the United States is
comparatively negligible (Barnett, 2002).
When the Hmong began to flee to Thailand in 1975, the UNHCR set up a series
of refugee camps along the Lao-Thai border. Though Laos shares borders with five
countries, the topography of the country made it difficult for refugees to flee anywhere
except Thailand (Chan 1994). As a result, these camps swelled with more than 100,000
refugees. Local integration in Thailand, the second durable solution to a refugee crisis,
was not possible because of the large number of refugees and because of the refusal by
the Thai government to allow permanent Indochinese immigration.
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The third durable solution, resettlement in a third country, began slowly for the
Hmong in 1975. Though they also were resettled in France, Australia, Canada, Argentina
and French Guyana, the vast majority of the Hmong came to the United States (Vang and
Flores 1999). By the end of 1976, the U.S. had resettled only 750 Hmong; thereafter the
numbers steadily began to rise. In 1980, the peak year for Hmong resettlement in the
U.S., 27,000 Hmong were admitted. By 1980, approximately 100,000 Hmong resided in
the United States (Yang 2001). According to the Office of Refugee Resettlement, there
were approximately 200,000 Hmong living in the United States in 1998 (Vang and Flores
1999), primarily concentrated in California, Minnesota, Wisconsin and North Carolina.
Once a refugee has been approved for resettlement in the United States,
responsibility for that individual is passed from the Department of State to one of 11
U.S.-based non-profit voluntary agencies (volags), also called resettlement agencies, to
arrange placement and transportation. If the refugee has relatives living in the United
States, efforts are made to resettle him or her nearby (Patrick 2002). However, if the
refugee does not have relatives in the United States, the resettlement agency determines
where in the country the refugee will be resettled. The availability of housing,
employment, needed services, readiness of the host community, and a variety of other
factors determine exact placement.
In the 1970s and 1980s, scatter policies were designed to disperse refugees across
the country. These policies were intended to impede the development of ethnic
communities “in order to bring about rapid assimilation into the host communities”
(Miyares 1998:3) Eventually, in the 1990s, volags recognized that the community
support found in ethnic enclaves actually helped the refugees gain self-sufficiency more
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rapidly (Miyares 1998). As a result, some resettlement agencies began to try as much as
possible to resettle refugees in areas where there were pre-existing ethnic communities.
For example, in 2000 Florida resettled more Cubans than all other states combined. New
York settled the most refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone. The largest number of
Sudanese resettled in Texas, and California received large numbers of Iranians (Patrick
2002). However, the US refugee program simultaneously maintains the policy that no
one state or community should become overburdened with high numbers of refugees
(Ruefle and Mandell 1992).
As part of the Refugee Act of 1980, every state is required to establish a refugee
program headed by a State Refugee Coordinator. This person is responsible for
managing the state’s program, including the dispersal of federal funds and the collection
of data about the refugees within the state. Additionally, the Coordinator works with
local non-profit and ethnic organizations to prepare for incoming refugees and to provide
services for those who have been in the country less than five years. The State Refugee
Coordinators work in conjunction with the volags to determine where in the state new
refugees should be resettled.
It is important to note that there is no requirement that refugees remain for any
length of time in the community in which they are originally resettled. Because many
sign an apartment lease upon arrival and because initial financial support is pre-arranged
by the resettlement agencies, many refugees remain in the host community for at least
their first year in the United States. However, secondary migration to areas with friends
and family, employment opportunities, a larger ethnic community, or more generous
public assistance programs is common. For example, several Somali families were
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resettled by a volag in Portland, Maine at the beginning of 2000, but the only available
housing was expensive and in poor condition. Lewiston, Maine’s population had been in
decline for over a decade, and many apartments in the downtown area stood vacant.
When Lewiston landlords heard about the housing shortage in Portland, they called
officials and told them that many apartments were available in their town (Bouchard
2002). Word quickly spread, and the Somalis that relocated began inviting family and
friends to join them. By October 2002, more than 1,000 Somalis had moved to Lewiston
from across the country and more were arriving at a rate of about a dozen each month
(Graham 2003).
A similar secondary migration occurred with the Hmong to California’s Central
Valley in the mid-1980s. Though scatter policies initially dispersed Hmong throughout
the country during this period, by the end of 1986, more than half of the Hmong in the
United States were residing in California (Yang 2001). The Hmong population in Fresno
grew from one family in 1977 to approximately 35 thousand by 1993. Wisconsin also
experienced high numbers of secondary Hmong migration. Attracted by a strong ethnic
infrastructure and high employment rates, thousands of Hmong have settled in the state.
By 2004, there were close to 50 thousand Hmong living in Wisconsin (Hmong
Resettlement Taskforce 2005:7).
Typically, through a network of over 450 local, mostly faith-based affiliates
across the country, the volags provide air transportation for the refugee directly to the
host community. Additionally they are responsible for reception at the airport, cultural
orientation, housing and initial medical screenings. The volags receive $800 per refugee
from the Department of State, which they are expected to supplement with private

13
donations and in-kind contributions to cover the refugee’s expenses for the first thirty
days (Patrick 2002).
A unique part of the refugee program in the United States is its flexibility. The
volag system must have the ability to expand and contract as the volume and ethnicity of
refugees quickly change. With these shifts in immigration, some needs change
dramatically and others remain constant. As a result, the refugee system requires a
combination of a consistent, basic infrastructure that has the flexibility to expand and
contract rapidly.
The volag provides each new refugee with a caseworker who usually speaks his
or her language to help with initial resettlement and orientation. Upon arrival, the
caseworker arranges for furnished housing, which the refugee usually must take
responsibility for by signing a lease. During the first few days in the United States, the
caseworker takes the refugees to register with the Social Security Administration, enrolls
refugee children in school, and provides a medical screening by local health personnel.
Additionally, the caseworkers familiarize the refugees with public transportation systems,
orientation to appliances and other features of their new homes, show them how and
where to buy food and clothing, and help the refugees find English as a Second Language
(ESL) classes in their communities.
As stated previously, refugees are admitted on humanitarian grounds, with no
requirement that they demonstrate economic self-sufficiency or have a sponsor who
guarantees their financial support (Vialet 2000). However, the stated goal of the
resettlement program in the United States is economic self-sufficiency within ideally 90
days, though subsistence funding can be extended for up to eight months (Vialet 2000).
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As a result, many volags have employment programs to help refugees get jobs soon after
arrival.
Refugee Community-Based Organizations
Mutual Assistance Associations (MAAs) are another key component of the
current U.S. refugee system. While the volag system is designed to handle immediate
needs, the MAAs have a more long-term approach to refugee assistance. Southeast Asian
refugee groups, especially the Vietnamese and the Hmong, were quick to organize aid
associations to help fellow refugees. In 1975, as the first of these forced migrants began
to arrive, many refugee leaders and Americans argued that self-help organizations could
provide assistance as well as, if not better than, mainstream organizations. According to
Majka and Mullan, early refugee resettlement policies “strongly encouraged South East
Asians to retain and build upon their ethnic, class and family resources as a means of
adapting to life in the US” (2002:76). They argue that refugee MAAs were viewed as
organizations that could provide a broad range of assistance to refugees, and in so doing,
could ease the social and economic adaptation difficulties that these groups often face
when resettling in the United States.
Currently, the Hmong have established MAAs in at least 23 states and have a
national Hmong organization in Washington, DC that convenes conferences, seeks grant
funding, and helps to build the capacity of local MAAs across the country. In Wisconsin
there are 17 active Hmong MAAs located throughout the state. Eight of these were
represented on the Taskforce.
In the 1980s, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare established an
Indochinese Mutual Assistance Division to coordinate and provide technical assistance to
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the MAAs. The Office of Refugee Resettlement, after its formation within the
Department of Health and Human Services, gave direct grants to a small number of
MAAs nationwide for a variety of services including orientation, counseling,
employment assistance, and interpretation. In 1992, ORR began an MAA incentive
grant, designed to encourage states to fund MAAs as part of their refugee programs. By
the end of the 1980s, more than 1,200 Southeast Asian and non South-East Asian refugee
MAAs had been created within the US (Majka and Mullan 2002).
The federal Office of Refugee Resettlement, which had an annual budget in fiscal
year 2001 of $433.1 million (Office of Refugee Resettlement 2001), still offers a variety
of targeted grants to MAAs each year to aid refugees who have been in the United States
for less than five years. Additionally, ORR also offers block grants to state governments
who may disperse these funds to MAAs and other organizations that continue to aid
refugees in the first five years of their transition to U.S. life. Examples of recipients of
these block grant dollars include volags, local governments, local school boards and nonprofit organizations that provide medical services, language training, employment
services and community awareness programs (Patrick 2002).
Context and Unit of Analysis
The context of analysis in this study includes both the refugee resettlement system
in Wisconsin and the Hmong community in the state. The unit of analysis for this study
is the Governor’s Hmong Resettlement Taskforce.
The Hmong People in Wisconsin
The Hmong is an ethnic group that traditionally lives in the highland areas of
Laos and Thailand. The CIA and U.S. military recruited many Hmong during the
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Vietnam War to fight as insurgents against a growing Communist group in Laos. After
U.S. troops withdrew from Vietnam in 1975, Laos fell to the communist Panthet Lao
movement. The Hmong were persecuted, and many were massacred, causing a mass
exodus across the Mekong River into Thailand, where refugee camps were established by
the United Nations. Thousands of Hmong escaped to Thailand over the next decade.
Many were eventually resettled in third countries, most of them coming to the United
States. In 2001, there were approximately 200 thousand Hmong living in the U.S.,
concentrated in Minnesota, Wisconsin and California (Yang 2001).
The first Hmong arrived in Wisconsin in 1976. As has been the case with most
refugee movements, the first to arrive were those deemed the most likely to assimilate
quickly. This included the most highly skilled, those with the most education, those who
could speak English, and those with ties to the United States. For the Hmong, this
included the officers in the resistance movement. Later waves of Hmong were largely
agrarian workers, with little to no education; many could not read or write in their native
language. According to documents presented by the Wisconsin Department of
Workforce Development (DWD) at the second taskforce meeting, most Hmong in
Wisconsin are currently employed in manufacturing, production, sales, and the service
industry.
Thousands of Hmong chose not to be resettled in the 1970s and early 1980s, when
the U.S. was accepting large numbers. Fear of moving to an unfamiliar part of the world
fueled by rumors of American doctors who hurt patients and ate livers, of urban violence
and gangs, of not being able to sacrifice animals, and of being imprisoned without
foundation caused many to remain in the refugee camps (Fadiman 1997). Additionally,
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the guerilla resistance continued, though to a much smaller scale, throughout the 1980s.
Many hoped that the communist regime in Laos would be eventually fail allowing the
Hmong to return (Koltyk 1998).
By 1992, the Thai government began to change its policy toward the Hmong
living along its borders. After allowing the camps to exist for more than fifteen years, the
Thai government began to protest in the early 1990s that the Hmong were no longer
political refugees but instead were economic migrants. Thai authorities gave the Hmong
two options: either return to Laos, or apply to immigrate to a different country. Faced
with only two options, most of the Hmong applied to the United States for refugee status.
However, U.S. policy toward the Hmong had changed and more restrictions were being
placed on attaining refugee status. Additionally, approximately ten thousand Hmong
rejected both options and fled the camps, fearing repatriation to Laos (Fadiman 1997).
By the mid-1990s, approximately 15,000 of these Hmong had found a home on
the grounds of Wat Tham Krabok, a Buddhist temple in central Thailand. The Thai
government repeatedly tried to close the settlement over the ensuing decade, but the
Abbot, who had official authority over the temple, refused. The Thai government never
provided any infrastructure for the settlement. Access to medical care and education
were limited. Most of these Hmong relied on physical labor at a nearby rock quarry or
needlework and other handicrafts for economic support. They were not allowed to attain
Thai citizenship or permanent residence, making life there precarious (Office of Global
Health Affairs 2004).
In 2003, the Abbot died. Soon after, the Thai government warned the United
States and United Nations that it was considering repatriation of these Hmong to Laos.
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After years of lobbying by the Hmong community in the U.S., the State Department
announced in December 2003 that it would finally accept the 15 thousand Wat Hmong
for resettlement between the months of June and December 2004. However, due to
processing delays and several cases of active tuberculosis, the resettlement was extended
through summer 2005 (Boucher 2005). This resettlement was unique for three reasons.
First, it was to be one of the most rapid resettlements in the history of the US refugee
system. Second, nearly 98 percent of these refugees joined family members in only three
states – Minnesota, Wisconsin, and California. Finally, prior to this resettlement, there
was a ten-year period when almost no Hmong immigrated to the United States.
On July 1, Jim Doyle, the Governor of Wisconsin, announced the creation of a
Special Advisory Hmong Resettlement Taskforce. The 27-member taskforce was
charged with providing recommendations to the Governor and Secretary Roberta
Gassman of the Department of Workforce Development (DWD) on matters relating to a
large resettlement of Hmong refugees from Thailand.
According to the official website for the taskforce, its goals were to make
recommendations about:
system improvements, best practices, employment connections, housing,
citizenship, and access to needed services to successfully integrate this
new refugee population into our state. The Task Force supported
community resettlement efforts and advised the state agencies on
communication strategies and collaboration opportunities (Hmong
Resettlement Taskforce 2004).
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Cultural Background
Clan and kinship form the foundation of Hmong culture. Alliances of families,
created through marriage, reflect social, economic, and political ties (Koltyk 1998). An
extended clan and lineage system which is patrilineal, patriarchal, and patrilocal
characterizes the Hmong social organization and family life. Marriage is the key that
maintains social organization. As anthropologist Jo Ann Koltyk explains, “Marriage is
the creative principle which links clans and individuals. To the Hmong, marriage means
having a family and also having good relationships with other clans” (1998:42). Because
clan is considered family, a cultural taboo forbids Hmong from marrying within their
own clan, thus extending social organization (Fadiman 1997).
Hmong culture includes about twenty clans, with more than a dozen represented
in Wisconsin (Koltyk 1998). The taskforce included members of nine clans, though more
were represented through kinship and marriage ties. Based on interviews with taskforce
members, though it remains an important cornerstone of Hmong life in Wisconsin, clan
was correctly not a factor in recruitment to the Taskforce. Instead, the Hmong member
responsible for recruitment sought “those who have very much influence on the
community and have already served the community for many years.” This is consistent
with Koltyk’s finding that although Hmong families continue to practice traditional forms
of decision-making in Wisconsin, often leadership positions are based on an individual’s
education and knowledge of American culture and service systems rather than on their
status as the household’s eldest male member (1996).
Family size presented important challenges for the Taskforce. Because of the
importance of kinship ties and their agrarian roots, the Hmong in Southeast Asia tend to
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have large families with many children, and define household as consisting of a man, his
wife or wives, his sons, and their wives and children (Koltyk 1998). The Wat Hmong are
no exception. More than sixty percent of the new refugees are under age 18, and most
families include more than four members.
During “welfare reform” in the late 1990s, Wisconsin overhauled its public
assistance program. The former system had determined aid based on family size.
However, the new system, known as W2, limits monthly assistance to $673 per family,
irregardless of size, and is time-limited to only two years. Additionally most low-income
housing in Wisconsin is based on a family of four. Both of these policies contradict the
needs and expectations of the Hmong. Additionally, the large number of children in the
group at the wat was expected to put strain on the school systems in the areas where the
Hmong settled.
Development of the Wisconsin Resettlement System
In Wisconsin, the refugee system began in the mid-1970s to help the federal
government relocate 1,500 refugees resulting from collaboration with U.S. troops in
South East Asia during the Vietnam War. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Wisconsin
continued to resettle mainly Hmong refugees. As a result, the state system invested
heavily in programs designed to serve the Hmong, especially in mutual assistance
associations. The volag network in the state began to breakdown in the 1990s as Hmong
migration decreased.
The state refugee coordinator can only invest federal funds into programs that
target refugees within the first five years after resettlement. In the late 1990s, the
Wisconsin MAAs hit this five-year time limit because Hmong immigration had ended.
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During this same period, the federal refugee program shifted focus away from Cold Warera refugees to a more broad-based system that included smaller groups of more than 65
ethnic groups. The Wisconsin program stopped funding the Hmong organizations and
began to reinvest in the volags so that they would be able to resettle these new refugee
populations. During the last five years, in addition to smaller resettlements, the program
has brought in several hundred Somali Bantu and former Yugoslav refugees.
By the time the Department of State announced in 2003 that the Wat Hmong were
eligible to resettle in the United States, Wisconsin’s refugee program had focused its
efforts on other populations. As a result, much of the infrastructure that had previously
existed for new Hmong refugees had deteriorated. For this reason, the Taskforce was
seen by many members as an important way to revitalize these former networks.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Anthropologists have a long history of conducting research for policy. In fact,
most early anthropological studies were used to support government programs and
policies aimed at establishing direct administrative control in colonial settings over native
populations (van Willigen 2002). During WWII, anthropologists worked with the War
Relocation Authority to conduct ethnographic studies of Japanese culture that the U.S.
government used to make policies for post-war reconstruction in Japan (Spicer 1976).
Margaret Mead was very active in the policy arena throughout her career, testifying
before congressional committees on issues ranging from NASA, housing, urban
development and education reform. She also had a close friendship with President Carter
and his wife and advised him on various policy matters (Dillon 1980).
In more recent years, anthropology has been used to design more effective
medical and environmental programs. For example, Omidian and Lipson (1996)
conducted participatory action research to assess health in an Afghan community in
Northern California and to plan a culturally appropriate health education program. They
found that the state’s goals were incompatible with the community’s perceptions of
health care needs and provided suggestions about ways that the project could be altered to
be more effective. In an ethnographic study of a North Carolina initiative to reduce
chemical exposure among farm workers, anthropologists found that migrant laborers and
farmers had very different beliefs about the risk and responsibility of chemical exposure.
They suggested ways in which the program could be made more effective through the use
of this analysis (Quandt et al. 1998).
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These were studies for policy; they did not delve into policy construction and did
not give a face to the policy-makers. These studies examined the product of policy but
not the process through which it was created. Many studies of development projects and
policies, such as Art Hansen’s (2002) study of famine in Zambia, and Mark Grey’s
(1999) study of migrant workers in meatpacking plants, have been effective in rooting
local conditions in the larger context of national political economy and globalization.
However, these types of studies do not give a face to those people responsible for
decision-making. They are effective in showing why a particular policy is not working,
or the degree to which it affected a segment of the population. However, these studies do
not analyze the policy-makers in the culture from which the policies are produced. As
James Peacock asserted in the Presidential Address at the 1995 annual meetings of the
American Anthropological Association: “Applied anthropology is often a mop-up
operation, identifying and solving problems caused by bad policy” (1997:13). In this
thesis, I attempt to delve into the decision-making process to reveal how the Taskforce
created its policy recommendations.
Defining Policy
Essential to the anthropological study of policy is to first define the word itself. Policy is
a reaction to a perceived problem, and every level of policy construction and
implementation uses its own discourse to define the problem and its solution. In this
work, policy refers to three different levels of thought and action within institutions.
First, it is a written statement that defines a problem and explains how it is to be resolved.
This is the outward face of public policy. In this study, the final taskforce report (see
Appendix C) is this written policy statement.
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Second, policy is the unwritten, embedded assumptions, ideology, and images that
policy professionals hold about ‘the people’ and ‘the problem’ that shape their actions
and can be at odds with the written statement (Wright 1995). This is the level of policy at
which hegemony thrives because it is often based on “common sense” or that which is
“obvious” or “natural” about the problem. Policy-writing is not a value-free endeavor.
In any organization -- governmental, non-profit or private for-profit -- the decisionmakers have their own perspective, philosophy, ideology, and product to sell, be it their
ideology, policy, service, or a commodity (Weaver 1985). The Taskforce encompassed
several key assumptions that affected its final product.
Third, policy encompasses the procedures and routines that practitioners and
bureaucrats follow on the street- and field-level. As political scientist Robert Lineberry
writes: “The implementation process is not the end of policy-making, but a continuation
of policy-making by other means” (DiNitto 2003:16). Of course, the people at this level
have their own set of assumptions, ideology, and images about “the people” and “the
problem,” which makes policy-implementation also embedded with values (Wright
1995). Implementation may produce results that vary greatly from those articulated in
the written statements or the shared ideology of the policy professionals (Wright 1995).
For example, Mizrachi and Shuval found that formal medical and discipline-wide policy
and discourse drew a line between “proper biomedicine” and “improper alternative
medicine”. However, through participant-observation and interviews, they found that
biomedical and alternative medical practitioners collaborated regularly in hospitals and
shared a mutual respect at odds with the biomedical field’s discourse (2004:1649). In
this thesis, the Hmong MAAs, resettlement agencies, and state and local social service
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providers are the groups that would eventually implement the policy changes that result
from the recommendations of the Taskforce.
There is, of course, a crucial fourth level of policy: “The people” to whom the
policy is addressed. In this study, the new Hmong refugees are the focus of the taskforce
policy recommendations. It is important to question the degree to which the policy
narrative is defined by the people, or in this case the new refugees, and to what extent
their own reality is defined by this narrative (Wright 1995). Because anthropology has
traditionally drawn much of its strength from understanding and identifying with the
emic, local perspective, a number of anthropological studies have examined how public
policies affect different populations. For example, Hall et al. (2001) used focus groups to
understand why recidivism was high among substance-abusing women on parole in
California. They uncovered several policy problems with both the Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families (TANF) regulations and the Forever Free initiative that made women
unlikely to attend the program’s community treatment sessions after leaving prison.
Similarly, in an anthropological study of a sustainable development project in rural
Honduras, Loker (2000) found that though the project’s planning documents
demonstrated an attempt to involve the poor of the region, implementation of the project
was not so inclusive. He found significant problems with the top-down policies
employed by the international non-profit organizations responsible for the project that
prevented the local population from embracing the reforestation program. In both cases,
policies failed to work as planned because they were not devised with input from the
intended beneficiaries. In the Data and Analysis portion of this thesis, I discuss the lack
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of input from the new refugees and their anchor families in the policy process employed
by the Taskforce.
Beyond the “Subaltern”
Anthropological studies like those discussed above are important because they
reveal inequities in society while they simultaneously give voice to previously silenced
segments of the population. However, they also usually offer an incomplete picture of
the policy that they investigate. As Edward Spicer recounted about his employment with
the War Relocation Authority (WRA) during World War II, when the new policy of
“separation and segregation” of Japanese-Americans was first discussed, he contemplated
resigning twice.
Over a period of weeks I learned something of the nature of the variety of
factors which the policy-makers had considered, and considered carefully,
in making their decision. My view had been limited to only one of those
factors, namely, the opinion and behavior in the evacuee community
(Spicer 1976:123).
He learned that there was great pressure on several sides including the House UnAmerican Activities Committee, a Senate investigating committee, The American
Legion, state governors, and powerful activists to close the relocation centers and actually
turn them into concentration camps. The WRA was opposed to this drastic step, but was
under pressure to take some action, lest Congress step in and create concentration camps.
“To put it simply, they saw the greatest good for the greatest number of evacuees being
served by segregation” (Spicer 1976:126). Though he morally opposed the policy of
segregation, when he spoke to policy-makers about the constraints under which they had
to make decisions, the anthropologist agreed not to resign.
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As the Spicer example illustrates, to believe that only those to whom the policy is
addressed, “the people,” have a stake in how the problem is defined is to miss an
enormous part of the picture. By calling it a cultural product, public policy can be seen
as a means through which the various actors define themselves within the policy arena
and within the larger scope of the culture, be it, for example, “the victim,” “the decisionmaker,” “the expert,” or “the person who gets things done”. It is important to realize that
policy not only affects the lives of those for whom the policy is intended, but also the
lives of the people involved in the policy process. As discussed in the Data and Analysis
section of this thesis, taskforce members had a variety of reasons to be personally
concerned about the discourse that the group constructed.
The field of anthropology was traditionally rooted in the study of the exotic
“other”. This perspective is in part the legacy of the Boasian goal of preserving cultures
that focused anthropology away from complex society, bureaucracies, policy-makers and
politicians (Weaver 1985). As more and more anthropologists over the last thirty years
have shifted their focus inward, this perspective has manifested itself in favor of the study
of the subaltern in our “own” societies (Nader 1969; Shore 2002; Wright 1995). The
traditional, emic approach to ethnography has led to “the appearance of a persistent bias
for the powerless and against the powerful”(Weaver 1985:200).
This bias has also caused anthropologists to redefine “the other”. Instead of an
exotic native of another culture, as was the Boasian model, the “political elite” within the
anthropologists’ home cultures has become the anthropological “other”. By creating an
antagonistic framework for viewing policy-makers as outside of the cultural context in
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which they operate and actually create and implement policy, anthropologists make
effective advising and assessment problematic (Weaver 1985).
When concentrating on the subaltern, it is easy to see policy as hegemonic. The
very idea of policy-makers and decision-makers brings to mind images of power,
exclusivity and separation from “the people” (Shore 2002). However, by adopting this
view of policy as outside of the cultural realm and only studying the subaltern in society,
anthropologists actually perpetuate these hegemonic forces.
In 1969, Laura Nader warned that by concentrating on the powerless,
anthropology frames certain issues and social “problems” as the domain of only the poor.
This approach has helped to mold our view of how social problems are conceived and
where solutions may lie. For example, drugs and crime are often seen as issues of the
lower-class or youth that are the product of the subculture in which they thrive. Few
ethnographies in the late 1960s concentrated on drug usage among the elite or middleclass. Likewise, white collar crime received scant attention from ethnographers (Nader
1969). Anthropological studies that concentrate on the problems of the powerless can
serve to perpetuate the dominant discourse about the problem and its solutions.
Hegemony is an important concept in the study of policy but can also be a
limiting, catch-all framework. Policy is complicated because it is fluid and is constantly
being negotiated. Attributing policy to hegemonic forces does not tease out the very real
human and cultural negotiation that constantly shapes and reshapes policy. In van
Willigen and Channa’s (2002) study of dowry death in India, the authors argue that the
government policies directed at the elimination of “bride burning” focus on punishment
but do not address the cultural causes of the practice. Many policies are designed with a
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similar approach. Anthropologists are in the unique position to contribute to effective
policy formation by showing why these policy-makers ignore the underlying causes of
the problem.
Viewing policy as a process that exists outside of the cultural realm also presumes
that policy comes from the centers of ‘power,’ from inside the Washington beltway, and
ignores the necessity of two-way communication between communities and institutions
in creating sound public policy. Public policy-makers often act sluggishly, making
changes to catch up with the more rapid changes in societal behaviors and beliefs, as was
the case with the Civil Rights Act following slowly in the wake of the civil rights
movement (Preister 2003). Additionally, by not studying public policy as a cultural
process, anthropologists ignore the constant renegotiation of policy at the varying levels
of construction.
Like Nader, George Marcus argues that by excluding sites of systemic power,
such as “institutions of media, markets, states, industries, universities – the worlds of
elites, experts and middle classes” ethnography is an inadequate representation of culture
(Marcus 1998). Different facets of culture are revealed when the point of reference is
those to whom power has been delegated (Nader 1969). For example, Lyon-Callo’s
study of the Massachusetts homeless sheltering industry revealed that funding agencies,
through their grant requirements, reinforced the dominant narrative about the causes of
homelessness and thus restrained resistance and alternative solutions among shelter staff
and residents (1998). Similarly, this study shows that the federal policy structure, which
separates short-term and long-term refugee services, influenced the dominant narrative of
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the Taskforce that equates employment and self-sufficiency. Because of this federal
structure, policy alternatives for the Taskforce were suppressed.
An Anthropological Study of Policy Construction
The anthropological study of policy goes beyond evaluating or advising on a
particular policy product. Instead, it looks on public policy as a process that constitutes
and is constituted by culture. In doing so, it shows how a particular policy discourse
becomes dominant while others are marginalized. In this thesis, I examine how the
Taskforce constructed the dominant discourse embodied in the final report and the
reasons for the suppression of other narratives.
Because policy-making has the added complication of being a political endeavor
in which power dynamics can be explicit (Wright 1995), anthropologists should apply
the same kind of detailed ethnographic study to the culture of power and policy-making
as they do to the study of a Balinese cockfight (Geertz 2004). Without the development
of theories of public policy based upon anthropological principles and methodology, we
are in danger of blinding ourselves to the intricacies of the process and only seeing the
dominant narrative and the subaltern discourses. Such a narrowed perspective limits the
way a problem can be defined, and thus the ways in which it can conceivably be solved
(Preister 2003).
In the study of policy, the empathy that anthropologists cultivate through
participant-observation can be extended beyond just those to whom the policy is
addressed, but also to the actors at the levels of creation and implementation. By
pursuing dialogical relationships with people at the varying levels of policy formation, an
anthropology of public policy uncovers more than just the dominant narrative. Each of
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these discourses reveals important parts of the larger picture of why a particular policy
narrative is the one that defines the situation and another does not (Wright 1995).
Ethnography of policy means the anthropologist will gain empathy for people at
varying levels of power who are often in conflict with each other. Policy-makers must
become more than just a vague, slightly hostile, faceless image. They must become
tangible, cultural actors. The policy anthropologist may study policy formation, decisionmaking, the policy-maker’s culture, and organizations where policy is administered, with
the goal of an empathic understanding of the values of these people and their
organizations (Weaver 1985). In this study, I attempt to achieve an empathic
understanding of the taskforce members and the challenges that they faced in their own
organizations. Additionally, I seek to gain their perspectives about refugee resettlement
in general and this incoming population in particular.
By studying “up” instead of “down,” the power dynamics between the
anthropologist and subject of study change. As Susan Wright explains: “It was easier to
achieve a dialogical relationship with farmers, as it was the researcher who was
committed to conceding power, than with bureaucrats who do not readily concede the
power to define” (1995:77). Nader views this reversal of power roles as an important
step forward because for so long anthropology was steeped in fieldwork that sprang from
this uneven power structure (1969). The inversion of this relationship is bound to
produce new theories as the anthropologist is compelled to be conscious of, and reflexive
about, her position within the wider system of power and policy (Shore 2002). I gained
access to the Taskforce through a fellowship with the federal government. As a result, I
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was always careful to differentiate my personal opinion from a federal government
perspective during participant-observation of taskforce meetings.
A study of the policy-making process has positive implications for applied
projects, as well. Eventually the study of a policy process must become a study for
improving policy. Evaluation studies of a policy are not necessarily effective if they do
not include an understanding of the process through which it was created. One way to do
this is to examine how a particular policy and the discourses surrounding it are
transformed through time (Wright 1995). Policy is not static and to study it as a snapshot
and outside of its historical and political context loses many of its cultural nuances. The
anthropologist can explain the processes of this ideological transformation; how some
discourses within the policy structure become authoritative and others do not (Wright
1995). In this study, interviews were conducted with taskforce members throughout the
six months in which the group was convened. This allowed me to understand the
evolution of the Taskforce’s discourse over time.
With an empirically based understanding of the nature and culture of policymaking, decision-makers could be more aware of their own cultural biases and how these
influence the policy that they create. The anthropologist also can investigate whether
something in the process of decision-making at the top in Washington or in the middle, at
the bureaucratic level, “were causes of , rather than solutions to, some of the ‘problems’
on the ground”(Wright 1995). Additionally, the anthropologist can uncover how much
input “the people” have in defining their own situation, where the power in the process
lies, where the policy fails, and thus where to concentrate efforts at positive change.
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As the discipline makes strides toward taking a more active role in public policy
formation, it is important to keep in mind Paulo Freire’s caveat that real social change is
created through dialogue. He warns that treating the “oppressed” as objects to be studied
and then, based on this analysis, writing a prescription for how to behave simply
reinforces the system of oppression, the dominant policy narrative (1970). Any attempt
at change must involve their participation. I would extend this to say the same of policymakers. Without the acknowledgement of policy-makers as cultural actors through their
involvement in a dialogical relationship, any critique of policy becomes functionally
irrelevant.
This thesis builds upon the work of Nader, Wright and Shore by offering a case
study of a policy process. Through a dialogical relationship with the taskforce members,
this study examines how this taskforce and the policy recommendations that it
constructed are both a reflection of culture and a human product. I explore not only the
dominant discourse of the Taskforce’s final report, but also the constraints that prevented
other narratives from becoming dominant.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
This empirical, ethnographic study relies on participant-observation, semi-structured
interviews, and document analysis to reveal the dominant discourse and to uncover the
other narratives that taskforce members expressed about their role in the new
resettlement. Additionally, a study of a policy process inherently becomes a study for
policy. As such, this research will also provide insight into how future taskforces, and
preparation for resettlements, can be more effective.
Research Questions
Specifically, research questions focused on four areas:
•

What was the dominant narrative, as evidenced through the report presented to the
Governor, and who controlled it? What assumptions were embedded in this
narrative? In other words, how were the problems and the solutions framed, and
by whom?

•

What factors constrained other narratives, the other interpretations of the issues
presented during the interviews or during committee discussion from either being
voiced or eventually becoming part of the report?

•

Each taskforce member represented a different organization, usually as its head or
director. This included state and local government agencies, non-profit
organizations, and local Hmong mutual assistance associations. How did these
representatives see themselves and the role of their own organization in the
resettlement? Additionally, how did this compare to the way taskforce members
viewed the roles of the other types of organizations involved in the resettlement?
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•

Many local communities have used taskforces to prepare for a new resettlement of
refugees. What was successful about this taskforce, and how could this type of
taskforce be more effective?

Field Research Site
Fieldwork is the hallmark of anthropology. Traditionally this has entailed a long
period of time, six months or more, of “intensive hanging out” in a remote community
followed by a period of reflection and analysis away from the field. James Clifford
asserts that in anthropology “the exotic exemplar –co-residence for extended periods
away from home, in the ‘tent in the village’ – retains considerable authority. But it has,
in practice, been decentered” (1997:60). As technology and the world have changed, so
has the definition and practice of fieldwork in anthropology. Clifford also explores the
idea that native anthropologists study “down” or “out” within their own cultures in order
to have that same kind of fieldwork experience, intensive and displaced from the
academic environment. However, when studying “up,” the fieldwork orientation must
follow those with the power to define. George Marcus suggests that “to do ethnographic
research, for example, on the social grounds that produce a particular discourse of policy,
requires different practices and opportunities than does fieldwork among the situated
communities such policy affects”(1998:84).
In this study, the field site was the Taskforce itself. Because this was a group of
people who only convened for the taskforce meetings, participant-observation took place
during these meetings, and more informally before and after each meeting and during
lunch breaks. Additionally, during the first taskforce meeting, the group broke into six
committees, which were essentially workgroups to cover particular policy areas. These
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committees were: Health, Mental Health, Housing and Transportation, Economics,
Family Issues, and Education. The committees generally met at the end of each taskforce
session and conducted telephone conference calls and wrote on-going emails about drafts
of reports and relevant issues that arose as the refugees began to arrive. I conducted
participant-observation with three of the committees – Health, Mental Health, and Family
Issues.
The Taskforce met in person, as a whole, five times between July 21, 2004 and
February 23, 2005. Four of these meetings were held in Madison, Wisconsin, and one
was held in Wausau, Wisconsin. Generally, the meetings lasted three to four hours and
were arranged by the State Refugee Coordinator, Sue Levy, and her staff. The meetings
were chaired by Kaying Xiong, a Hmong elementary school principal from Eau Claire,
Wisconsin. The Chair and State Coordinator worked together before each meeting to
devise an agenda of the topics to be discussed. The Governor made opening remarks at
the initial taskforce meeting, but thereafter was not involved in the meetings.
Each committee was headed by a chair, and workgroup meetings were held at the
chair’s discretion. The Health Committee conducted a conference call an average of once
every three to four weeks from August through December. The Family Issues
Committee, on the other hand, met only twice outside of the full taskforce. The Mental
Health Committee had conference calls approximately once every six weeks. (See
Appendix A for a breakdown of taskforce and committee members.)
Role of the Researcher
I became involved with this taskforce through my fellowship with the
Humanitarian and Refugee Division of the Office of Global Health Affairs (OGHA), U.S.
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Department of Health and Human Services, located in Washington D.C. in the summer of
2004. I attended the initial taskforce meeting along with the OGHA team leader, who
made a presentation about health conditions of the Hmong in the Wat. After the meeting,
the team leader, the state refugee coordinator and I spoke about the need for an OGHA
representative to act as a liaison between the federal office and the Taskforce. Though
my fellowship ended in August 2004, I continued to attend the taskforce meetings and to
pass relevant information to OGHA. Additionally, I acquired information from OGHA
for the Taskforce about federal issues that would affect their recommendations.
My role in the Taskforce was two-fold. During full taskforce meetings, I acted as
a participating-observer, sitting outside of the taskforce circle along with presenters and
other adhoc members. Because this was the Governor’s Taskforce, only members
appointed by him became official taskforce members. As such, I was careful not to speak
or participate in these meetings unless invited to by the Chair or the State Refugee
Coordinator. During committee meetings, I was an observing-participant, providing
input and evaluation to discussions that occurred surrounding particular issues and
anticipated problems. Additionally, because of my connection to OGHA, when issues of
federal policy arose, such as health screening requirements in unique situations, I was
able to get the relevant information and pass it back to the committee.
Rapport
Rapport is essential for any ethnographic study. It involves breaking through the
boundaries that exist between the anthropologist and the research participants. According
to van Willigen, “through the building of rapport, we erode the informants’ tendency to
protect private personalities” and personal information (2002:51). I was in a unique
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position to be able to establish rapport in three different ways. First, through my
connection to OGHA, I was able to contribute necessary information in the committee
workgroups and thus establish legitimacy with the state and local government officials on
the Taskforce. Second, I had worked with Tibetan and Burmese refugees in India and
Thailand in 2000 and 2001, and had volunteered with a resettlement agency in Atlanta,
Georgia. This allowed me to empathize with the concerns and perspectives of the
resettlement agencies and local non-profit agency heads represented on the Taskforce.
Finally, I had spent six weeks in Laos and had visited two Hmong villages in Thailand in
2001. These experiences helped me to build rapport with the Hmong members of the
Taskforce.
Research Participants
Research participants were the 27 members of the Governor’s Hmong Taskforce.
They ranged in age from late-20s to mid-60s and included people from eight
communities in which the Hmong were scheduled to resettle. They represented a variety
of Hmong agencies, public social service agencies, schools, city offices, and churches.
The Taskforce included two city mayors, two resettlement agency heads, eight people
representing Hmong mutual assistance associations, two Hmong police officers, six
officials from state government agencies, five representatives of local and county
government agencies, once church director and one retired activist. Fifteen of the
members were Hmong; twelve were women. It should be noted that three taskforce
members never attended a single meeting. A list of the taskforce members, which is a
matter of public record, is provided in Appendix A.
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Specific Methodology
Participant-Observation
As stated above, this study involved the use of participant-observation of the
taskforce meetings and three of the six committees’ meetings. During all of these
meetings, I took descriptive notes and used an observation protocol that included:
•

Attendance: who was present

•

Topic Discussed: amount of time discussed, who spoke about it and what was
said

•

Participation: who spoke and how often, divided by type of organization
(MAA, local government, state government, non-profit) and type of taskforce
member (male/ female, Hmong/ non-Hmong)

After each taskforce meeting, I wrote analytical field notes giving my initial impressions
about what had happened during the meeting.
Additionally, I took extensive descriptive notes during committee meetings and
telephone conference calls. After each of these, I wrote analytical field notes about what
had happened during these meetings. I digitally recorded all telephone conference calls
to be used for later reference and for additional analysis.
Semi-Structured Interviews
This study also employed the use of semi-structured interviews with taskforce
members to gain insight into their views about the Taskforce, their definitions of success
in a resettlement effort and for individual refugees, the role of their organization in this
resettlement, and their views about how this type of taskforce could be more effective.
According to Bernard, semi-structured interviews are especially useful in projects
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focused on bureaucrats, managers and people in power because they are “accustomed to
efficient use of their time” (1995:191). The use of an interview protocol demonstrates
that the researcher is prepared and in control of what is to be gained from the interview,
but still allows for both the researcher and interview participant to follow new leads
(Bernard 1995).
Twenty-one of the 27 taskforce members participated in the interview portion of
this study. Of the additional six members, three never attended a taskforce meeting and
three never responded to my attempts to arrange interviews. Additionally, the State
Refugee Coordinator was interviewed because of her intimate role in the construction of
the group, the organization of the meetings, her participation in the meetings and
ultimately the dispersal of federal funding from the Office of Refugee Resettlement to
many of the organizations represented by taskforce members. The State Refugee Health
Coordinator was also interviewed because of her attendance at the taskforce meetings and
participation in the Health Committee. Two rounds of interviews were conducted: one
while the Taskforce was in existence, and the second in summer 2005 after the Taskforce
had made its recommendations. (See Appendix B for a copy of the interview protocol
used.) Each interview participant signed a consent form before the interview took place.
The first round of interviews was conducted in English with all twenty-three
participants between the months of August 2004 and February 2005. Eight of the
interviews took place in person and the remainder were conducted via telephone.
Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and one and a half hours.
Interview participants for the first round of interviews broke down as follows:
•

Ten were Hmong
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•

Fourteen were women, including the Hmong chair

•

Two mayors

•

Eight were affiliated with an MAA

•

Six represented local or county government agencies

•

Seven represented State government agencies

•

Geographically, three represented Milwaukee, two came from LaCrosse, five
represented Wausau, three from Sheboygan, six worked in Madison, two
represented Green Bay, one from Eau Claire and one represented the Fox
Valley.

The second round of interviews was conducted in summer 2005 between the
months of June and August with a subset of seven of the original 23 interviewees. These
key informants were chosen based upon how informative they had been during the first
interview, their attendance at taskforce meetings, gender and ethnicity. These interviews
included: three Hmong members, four women, three men, and representatives from five
cities in Wisconsin.
All interviews were digitally recorded and later transcribed and analyzed using
grounded theory techniques such as open coding, constant comparison, and thematic
grouping with the use of Atlas ti qualitative software. This technique was effective for
this study because as codes were grouped into themes, the various discourses emerged.
This categorization allowed me to develop an understanding of how issues became
identified as problems and solutions were proposed. Additionally, the coding system
allowed me to identify discourses across interviews, while incorporating the perspectives
of multiple participants. As Strauss and Corbin explain, “grounded theories, which are
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abstractions quite like any other theories, are nevertheless grounded directly and
indirectly on perspectives of the diverse actors toward the phenomena studied”(Strauss
1994:274).
The limitation to fracturing and categorizing data in this manner is that it can lose
the contextual relationship that one statement or idea has with another (Maxwell 1998).
However, the “memo” function in the Atlas ti software package was valuable in this
ethnographic research. After each interview was conducted, descriptive and analytical
notes were taken. After transcription, these analytical notes were revised and expanded.
These were downloaded into the memo function of the software and continual analytic
memos were added as the data were examined in depth.
Pre-Fieldwork Research
During the summer of 2004, during my fellowship with the Office of Global
Health Affairs, I was charged with finding a community in which the Hmong would
resettle that would be open to working with OGHA on a new health promotion initiative.
I chose to concentrate my efforts on Wisconsin, primarily because it was the smaller of
the three states and the one about which the office knew the least. I began by using a
snowball technique to conduct fifteen open-ended telephone interviews in June 2004 with
service providers in nine Wisconsin communities. Participants included health
department personnel, resettlement agency workers, a Hmong doctor, two Hmong mental
health workers, a Hmong nurse, an English as a Second Language coordinator, school
system personnel, Hmong mutual assistance association workers, translators, interpreters,
and local housing personnel. The purpose of these interviews was to study how local
communities prepare for a new resettlement and to provide insight into where service
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gaps and overlaps existed. These interviews were not recorded; however, I took
extensive notes both during and after each interview. I discovered that since the mid1990s, no Hmong had been resettled in the state. The service networks that had existed
throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s had disappeared because no new Hmong
refugees were arriving. These interview notes were used as background information for
assessing the breadth of topics that the taskforce discussed, as well as acting as a
comparison for the preparation work conducted in Wisconsin before any of the refugees
had arrived and before the taskforce was convened.
Document Analysis
The final taskforce report to the Governor is the official and dominant discourse
in this study. As such, it has been analyzed using the same grounded theory techniques
utilized with the semi-structured interviews. Open-coding, constant comparison and the
emergence of themes were used to compare the semi-structured interviews with the
discourse embodied in the final report. This is effective because it “provides a rigorous
and detailed method for identifying categories and concepts that emerge from
text”(Bernard 1998:607-608). By comparing these themes and concepts to the semistructured interviews, the control of the dominant discourse emerged. Additionally, early
drafts of the report were used to trace the emergence of these themes and how they
evolved over time.
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DATA AND ANALYSIS
The Hmong Resettlement Taskforce was not inevitable or destined. Instead, it was a
human product that was organized by humans, consisted of humans and made
recommendations intended to affect humans. Thus, the Taskforce was inherently
cultural. In the following discussion, the Taskforce and the final report that it produced
are analyzed as a cultural process. The final report is a blueprint for how the State of
Wisconsin should act toward these new Hmong refugees, and in turn, how the new
Hmong should act in society. This is the dominant discourse of the Taskforce. Through
a combination of participant-observation, semi-structured interviews, and document
analysis, I discuss the evolution of this dominant discourse and the restraints that
prevented competing narratives from becoming dominant. Whenever possible, I let the
taskforce members speak for themselves.
The first section of this analysis discusses how the Governor’s initial charge to the
Taskforce affected this discourse. Within these written objectives was a tension between
long-term and short-term goals that was reflected in the final report, the interviews, and
the taskforce discussion. The underlying assumption that the Hmong elite on the
Taskforce could adequately represent the incoming refugees also affected the way that
the Taskforce saw its charge and prioritized needs for these newcomers. Finally, this
section concludes with an analysis of the definition of refugee success as described in the
report. During participant-observation and interviews with taskforce members, it became
apparent that competing definitions of success caused some issues to become contentious.
The example of drivers’ licenses is used to illustrate these competing narratives.
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The second section focuses on additional constraints on the narrative. These are
divided into two categories. Procedural constraints are those that governed how the
Taskforce conducted itself. These include the breakdown into workgroups, as well as
time and membership constraints. Macro constraints were caused by the larger context in
which the Taskforce operated. These included the Wisconsin economy, the budget
climate within the State, and the State’s existing social service network.
The third section of this analysis contains a discussion of the roles that
organizations play in a resettlement such as this one. The final report reflects the “ideal”
relationship among MAAs, resettlement agencies, and government social service
providers. However, the taskforce members made recommendations that would help
refugees in the “real” system in which their own organizations must operate. If the policy
recommendations put forth in the final report were enacted, these organizations would
eventually become the implementers. Therefore, the way that the dominant discourse
defines their roles in this ideal vision was vital to them. This section concludes with a
discussion about the applicability of the taskforce report and its recommendations to the
resettlement of other refugee populations.
The final section of this analysis focuses on intended and unintended
consequences of the Taskforce’s policy process. This includes a discussion of the
political meaning of the Taskforce for the Hmong community in Wisconsin.
Additionally, this section reveals positive outcomes of the policy process itself.
Dominant Discourse
During the initial meeting on July 21, 2004, Wisconsin Governor Jim Doyle laid
the foundation for the Taskforce that included five objectives:
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•

Study the data about the Hmong population, and learn about their demographics,
distribution and needs;

•

Examine the efforts of DWD, WHEDA, DHFS and local private and public
agencies in the resettlement process;

•

Provide a link to Hmong communities so that local agencies and individuals can
have their voices heard by policy makers in the Capitol;

•

Make recommendations for changes in policy, new activities, and partnerships to
improve the resettlement process; and

•

Tell the story of the Hmong in Wisconsin as a success story in the history of
Wisconsin. (Hmong Resettlement Taskforce 2005:2)
These objectives were broad enough that the Taskforce could have approached

them in a variety of ways. During early interviews with taskforce members, three distinct
approaches to policy change emerged. For some members, this was an opportunity to
completely reform the state’s resettlement system and to lay out an ideal blueprint for the
resettlement process. Other members wanted to work within the present system. They
envisioned the Taskforce examining the resettlement system in Wisconsin and
recommending incremental changes that would permanently make it more effective.
These changes would not necessarily involve legislative action, but could instead be
made within the state’s bureaucracy. A third subset of members sought only to
temporarily modify the present system to accommodate these incoming Hmong refugees.
These approaches reflect an ongoing tension within the resettlement system
between short-term and long-term goals. A bifurcated federal funding scheme, which
separates initial resettlement from ongoing refugee services, contributes to this tension.
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The Department of State only provides funding for the first 30 days after arrival. The
Office of Refugee Resettlement, through the State Refugee Coordinator, provides grants
to social service programs designed to aid refugees during the first five years after
resettlement. However, refugee populations have continuing needs long after these five
years elapse. As one member said, “They want a plan for dealing with the refugees from
Wat Thom Krabok, and we’re going to try and give them that. But then we have to go
back to our agencies and still have all of the other issues and all of the other people there
that haven’t been addressed.” Another taskforce participant said: “This is one
opportunity, even though we were talking about new Hmong resettlement, … to get the
Governor and the Cabinet to focus on integration issues. Important recommendations for
me were things like… to get DHFS to fund the mental health project. Do the new
Hmong need that? Hopefully not. But we know there’s a lot of Hmong who do need it.”
This separation between long-term and short-term resettlement goals within the
policy structure was never discussed in the general taskforce meetings nor in the three
committees in which I participated. However, the split was built into the taskforce
membership itself. The resettlement agencies, school systems, public health officials,
housing experts, and job training organizations represented on the Taskforce are all
focused on immediate needs. Mental health workers, college access officials, and the
MAAs are involved with refugees in a much longer timeframe.
In the interviews, many participants expressed the need for an integrated longterm and short-term approach, despite the policy system that separates them. For
example, one taskforce member described the need for education, job-skills training and
language training. “We have to do some high impact things up front to soften the impact
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of coming to the United States, but there is no way you could escape long-term needs.
This is not [a situation in which] they get a job and then you forget about them. [Their
needs are] too complicated for that.”
The final report has elements of the three policy change approaches, and thus
reflects both long-term and short-term needs. Table 1 contains an outline of the
recommendations constructed by the Taskforce, which I have broken into these three
policy change approaches.
As Table 1 illustrates, the policy change approach is centered on long-term needs.
The incremental change approach includes both long-term and short-term needs, and the
emergency measures approach focuses on short-term needs. In constructing an ideal
blueprint for resettlement, the policy change approach, a new statewide mental health
program is proposed. Additionally, a recommendation on housing outlines a new
program that would encompass job training, language training, and home-ownership.
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Table 1. Taskforce Recommendations Divided by Policy Change Approach & Timeframe
Policy Reform Incremental
Emergency
Change
Measure
Education
Support superintendent’s 2005-2007 Not classified because this was a pre-existing policy proposal
budget
that the committee is supporting, not proposing.
Increase number of ESL classes at
Short Term
technical colleges
Employment
Employment orientation
Short Term
Job training program
Short Term
Partial wage subsidies
Short Term
Employer advisory taskforce
Short Term
Housing and Transportation
Increase federal and state Section 8
Long Term
funding
Emergency housing assistance
Short Term
program
Identify surplus properties for
Short Term
immediate occupation
Revise Hmong drivers’ manual and
One time only
drivers’ test
Employment/ model housing
Long Term
program
Health and Dental Care
Increase MA reimbursement for
Long Term
dental
MA reimbursement for interpretive
Long Term
services
Link refugees with culturally
Long Term
appropriate health education.
Build surge capacity into public
Long Term
health system
Family Issues
Orientation for new refugees and
Short Term
anchor families
Provide bilingual case management
Long Term
Assist elderly attain citizenship
Long Term
Support culturally and linguistically
Long Term
competent domestic violence
services
Mental Health
Develop statewide culturally
Long Term
competent mental health services

50
Other recommendations suggest incremental changes to the current resettlement
system to make it more effective. For example, the taskforce report proposes that
additional English classes be added to the technical college network across the State.
Other recommendations include a re-translation of the driver’s manual to replace the poor
quality of the one in use, and assisting elderly and disabled refugees attain citizenship
within the current policy structure.
The report also recommends a number of short-term measures designed to
specifically target these new Hmong refugees. For example, the report suggests that
housing authorities should identify surplus units for immediate occupancy by the new
refugees. A short-term vocational skills training program is also proposed.
Most taskforce members felt that the use of all three policy change approaches
was appropriate because of the complexities of resettlement. For example, one taskforce
member acknowledged that “even though from the Governor’s framework it was a shortterm taskforce to deal with a crisis, it appropriately addressed some of those longer-term
issues.” Throughout this analysis, the tension between short-term and long-term goals
resurfaces repeatedly.
Embedded Assumptions
One role that anthropologists can play in the study of policy is to reveal the
underlying assumptions upon which policy-makers rely (Wright 1995). Embedded in
both the Taskforce itself and the report that it produced was the assumption that the
Hmong members of the Taskforce could speak for the incoming Hmong refugees and
their host families. This assumption became “common sense” among members. Neither
the main Taskforce nor any of the three subcommittees in which I participated discussed
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this issue. No site visits or interviews with the newcomers or their host families were
conducted. An important function of the Taskforce was to set priorities for the new
refugees. This embedded assumption influenced both what was discussed and the way
that these priorities were framed.
I question this assumption for a variety of reasons. First, the taskforce members
were among the Hmong elite. They were leaders in the community, including the first
Hmong school principal, one of the first Hmong elected to public office, and the first
Hmong to work on a state gubernatorial campaign. Additionally, all taskforce meetings
and correspondence were conducted in English, requiring a cultural and linguistic
competence that many of even the early Hmong refugees do not possess. Finally, these
Hmong immigrated more than 20 years ago into a country that had no infrastructure to
provide for their unique needs. Their refugee experience was very different from the
newly arriving refugees, who would stay with relatives upon arrival and would be able to
gain access to some services through bilingual, bicultural providers. The challenges of
the refugee experience for the newcomers could potentially be unlike those encountered
by the earlier refugees. Finally, culture is not static. For both the Hmong in the Wat and
the Hmong in the United States, norms have changed. Though both groups are Hmong,
what it means to be Hmong may be very different for the two groups.
Because the Hmong on the Taskforce were former refugees, it was assumed that
they understood both the cultural adjustment and the refugee experience that these
newcomers would undergo. As one non-Hmong member explained, “No one can
understand as well as a person who has gone through an experience. None of the rest of
us, no matter how much we’ve worked with the Hmong community, have an idea of what
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it is like to go through a refugee experience.” One female Hmong member said, “I think
that I’m just an extension of the people that we are trying to help here… I’ve become a
voice for Hmong new arrivals, voicing their concerns, voicing their needs and bringing
their experiences to the forefront.” As these quotations illustrate, many taskforce
members felt that Hmong members of the Taskforce adequately represented the anchor
families and the incoming refugees. An important role for anthropologists in the study of
policy formation is to determine to what extent the policy narrative is defined by “the
people”, or in this case, the new refugees, and to what extent this narrative is being
placed upon them (Wright 1995).
Throughout the interviews, Hmong members expressed how different their life
and their refugee experience were from that of these new arrivals:
There is quite a difference in terms of the refugees that are arriving now
and those of us who came many years ago. …We didn’t have to stay in a
refugee camp very long. Our experience in the refugee camp was
probably quite different than this refugee group that has been living [at the
wat] in Thailand for the last ten, 20, nearly 30 years. So they do have
different life experiences as refugees than many of us who came years
ago.
As the above quotation illustrates, the new Hmong refugees had been living at Wat Tham
Krabok for decades. Many, in fact, had been born and raised in the camp and had never
experienced life in Laos or life outside of the confines of the camp. In contrast, the
Hmong on the Taskforce were generally among the first to emigrate from the refugee
camps in Thailand and all had experienced life in Laos and outside of the camps.
Additionally, some Hmong taskforce members discussed how culture does not
remain static. Two examples follow:
I think the new Hmong that are coming here may find themselves
frustrated with the change that we have already made in this country. [As
part of] their preparation for their new life here, they need to
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accommodate the changes already made here. When they come here,
they are going to have to look at the family that they have here and not try
to apply the common law that they have in Thailand or in Laos, here in the
United States.
The Hmong here and the new Hmong, they are like two different people
now. [The former refugees] tend to be Americanized. The kids are
Americanized, and the newcomers want it to be like in Thailand. …The
Hmong society is different from here, I think, as far as how you treat your
kids and each family member’s responsibility and accountability.
This second speaker additionally expressed the different expectations of the two groups.
“We were careful and worked hard because we wanted to make sure that the relatives that
were left behind could come after. But this group, when they come in, they’re the last
group…They expect the people here to take care of them. They want the [anchor family]
to take care of them…. Expectations are different; it’s a different culture from the camp
and from here.” As these quotations illustrate, Hmong culture has not remained static,
either in the camp or in the United States. As such, additional burdens will be placed on
the new Hmong and on the anchor families when these differences become apparent.
As stated earlier, though Hmong in the United States practice traditional forms of
decision-making, often leadership positions are based on an individual’s education and
knowledge of American culture rather than on their status as the household’s eldest male
member. In adapting to American life, family practices have also changed. Early
marriage and polygamy are common practices in traditional Hmong culture. However,
they are illegal in the United States. Additionally, the social service network in the
United States defines family as a nuclear family for the distribution of goods and services.
In many ways this has undermined the Hmong conception of family as the extended
family (Chan 1994).
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In the Taskforce, it was also assumed that because many of the Hmong members
worked with MAAs and thus interacted with the anchor families and newcomers, they
could adequately represent newcomers’ needs. For example, one non-Hmong member
said, “I think the Hmong leaders from the MAAs know the needs of these folks better
than anyone else.” A Hmong member explained, “I think [a taskforce] does take people
who work hands-on and who actually have that experience to get involved because they
are speaking on behalf of the experiences that people are having in real life.” Some of
the MAA representatives did work closely with the new Hmong refugees. However,
others were more administrative and in charge of program development and grant
management rather than working day-to-day with the new refugees. Additionally, at least
one MAA representative expressed his feeling of distance from the new refugees:
“Sometimes I forget I am Hmong. Sometimes I forget I am a refugee. When these
people come, I sometimes tend to treat them as an outsider and not as an insider.” As this
quotation illustrates, some Hmong on the Taskforce felt that they were different from the
incoming refugees.
Only one taskforce member, a Hmong female, questioned these assumptions. Her
expectation when the Taskforce was formed had been that members would visit
newcomers and anchor families at MAAs across Wisconsin to gather information. As
she said, “All we did was meet and talk, talk, talk. We don’t know realistically … how it
is because we haven’t seen it. All we did was sit and talk, but we could have gone out
and seen it for ourselves. Maybe then we’d have had better ideas.” As this interview
revealed, not all Hmong members felt that the Hmong on the Taskforce adequately
represented the incoming refugees and their anchor families. When asked about this
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assumption, the state refugee coordinator said that in the past her organization had
conducted focus groups and administered surveys to refugee populations but that these
methods were not effective in getting a true grassroots perspective. The question
remains, however, how these refugees could have been adequately represented.
Economic Self-Sufficiency
The dominant discourse, as presented in the final report, defined refugee success
in economic terms. In describing the Hmong population in Wisconsin, the report states:
These Hmong refugees and former refugees have become very successful.
They have a median household income of $36,000, less than 1% of
households receive W-2 assistance, and more than 55% of families own
their own homes. Hundreds of businesses in Wisconsin are owned by
Hmong (2005:7).
In other sections, the report states that “Hmong refugees have successfully
obtained jobs and become productive citizens of their new communities,” and repeatedly
mentions the goal of “economic self-sufficiency as rapidly as possible”(2005:12-14). An
introduction to the Taskforce’s recommendations includes the following statement:
“Through this comprehensive package of services, refugees could move from
unemployment and subsidized rental housing to financial independence and homeownership” (2005:15). Additionally, the taskforce report describes the services necessary
for the “new Wisconsin residents to reach the American dream of financial security,
home ownership, and continuing education” (2005:12). As these statements indicate,
success and economic self-sufficiency became synonymous in taskforce discussion and in
the final report.
This focus on success in economic terms is partially a result of the international
resettlement system. Anthropologist Liisa Malkki (1995) argues that the international
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definition of the term refugee naturalizes the contemporary geopolitical order of
sovereign nation-states. Essentially, everyone has a place; everyone belongs somewhere.
Once they become stateless, people are normatively deviant. Without a country, the
refugee becomes less than a full-human (Harrell-Bond 1992). As Keely (1996) explains,
the nation-state system assumes that each person is the responsibility of their own
country. Refugee flows contradict this concept and thus threaten geopolitical structures
based upon the sovereign state.
After refugees have established their helplessness and statelessness to an
American official, they can be admitted to the Unites States for resettlement. Upon
entering the U.S., the policy discourse changes. The refugees are no longer stateless.
Because the United States has given them a place in the world, they are no longer
helpless.
This new policy discourse is part of the larger neo-liberal framework that has
dominated many social programs in the United States since the mid-1980s (Morgen and
Maskovsky 2003). Once they arrive in this country, resettlement policy stresses personal
responsibility and discourages refugees from reliance on public assistance. Neoliberalism views individuals as responsible for utilizing opportunities (Christie and Sidhu
2004). This framework holds refugees responsible for developing the opportunity given
them when they are granted residency in the United States.
As Senator Orin Hatch’s statement in a 2002 Immigration Committee hearing
asserts, by simply being in the United States, refugees’ lives are inherently better:
Each year, as a consequence of the refugee program, thousands of lives are
saved and bettered through relocation into the United States where
immigrants take refuge under the blanket of liberty and freedom that our
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Constitution provides. In short, generations are changed for the better, one
life at a time (Subcommittee on Immigration 2002:75).
In exchange for no longer being helpless, it is the refugee’s responsibility to not
become a burden. Many of the interviews echoed this belief. For example, one member
said that the goal of the Taskforce was to “integrate them as quickly as possible into our
system so they don’t become a burden to the tax payers.” Another member said that the
Taskforce was convened to “facilitate the ability to incorporate these people into our state
without being an overwhelming burden on local communities or state resources.” A
Hmong member of the Taskforce said that he hopes the new refugees “can be selfsufficient and don’t rely on social services all the time.” A social service official on the
Taskforce described the goal as “making sure that people have access to our programs
and … there are resources for them to become contributing citizens of the state of
Wisconsin.” All of these quotations refer to the high rate of welfare dependency that the
Hmong demonstrated in the 1980s. Participant-observation and the interviews revealed
that both Hmong and non-Hmong members of the Taskforce were aware of this legacy
and were anxious to show that the Hmong community in Wisconsin had become
“productive members of society” and that the new Hmong would not exhibit the same
high rates of dependency on social service programs.
As stated previously, refugees are admitted on humanitarian grounds, with no
requirement that they demonstrate economic independence. However, the federal
resettlement program pushes refugees to gain economic self-reliance within months of
arrival in this country. One taskforce member representing a resettlement agency
explained: “Technically our goal is self-sufficiency, meaning employment. That’s
entirely how we are based, and that is what we are judged on.” Federal policy requires
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that volags provide access to a number of services for new refugees, which include
orientation sessions, ESL classes, social service programs, and medical screenings.
However, the volags’ ability to resettle future refugees is entirely contingent upon
employment statistics of resettled refugees. Additionally, the welfare program in the
state, W2, has a two-year lifetime cap on public assistance. This puts additional pressure
on the refugees, and on the service providers dependent upon state and federal funds, to
find employment as soon as possible. This contributes to the dominant discourse that
equates independence with a job. For example, a Hmong member described the main
goal of the Taskforce as “helping the new refugees try to reach their employment goal,
self-sufficiency.”
Despite this dominant discourse that equated self-sufficiency solely to
employment, many on the Taskforce had a broader definition of what encompasses selfsufficiency. For example, one Hmong member discussed “economic and social selfsufficiency.” An MAA director described his role as helping the new refugees “maintain
their cultural identities and become self-sufficient, become tax-payers and homeowners.” Another taskforce member equated self-sufficiency with control: “control of
their destiny and the ability to act independently. [Ideally the refugee] obviously has a
job, has opportunities for continuing education and has the beginnings of assets and
savings.” As these interviews revealed, most taskforce members had a broader and more
long-term definition of success and self-sufficiency than the final report reflected.
Because of the federal policy structure, however, these competing definitions were
suppressed in the final report.
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These competing narratives that contain a broader definition of self-sufficiency
and independence manifested themselves in the taskforce discussions about drivers’
licenses. While most of the Hmong members regarded driving as a priority for the
incoming refugees, some of the state and local service providers viewed it as a waste of
resources. As one Hmong member explained, “For these individual refugees to be
successful, you can have an overall plan that provides for basic needs, but a driver’s
license is a good example. You need to obtain that as a means to get a job and move on.”
Another Hmong member equated driving with independence. His goal in working with
the new refugees is to “get each person to the point where [they are] able to get a job and
get a car and be able to live independently. Freedom, that’s what it is.” By equating
driving to independence and then to freedom, this interview participant revealed that
obtaining a driver’s license is far more than a practical necessity for refugees. It is
instead a means for the refugees to obtain control in their lives.
However, some members, consistent with the dominant discourse equating selfsufficiency solely to having a job, thought that driving should not be a priority. Because
a driver’s license was not necessary for jobs in most areas, they believed that the
Taskforce should not focus on it. This issue also reflects the tension between long-term
and short-term resettlement goals. As one member said, “[The new refugees] can’t afford
a car right away. [They] can’t afford the insurance right away. We are more concerned
with housing issues, with communicable diseases [than in] getting families a drivers
license. We’ll arrange mass transit. It’s a real difference in priorities in terms of what’s
important.” Another member recalled the debate about driving: “Well, the [Hmong] were
saying, ‘yeah, that’s a real need.’ Cars are important to them… [there was a taskforce
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member] with apparently not a lot of knowledge of the community saying, well they
don’t really need to have that.” These quotations illustrate the tension caused by
conflicting definitions of self-sufficiency.
One Hmong member summed up the issue of drivers’ licenses:
I would like to have the federal government or the State invest money to
help the people be able to drive so they can go to work. …Is that a realistic
goal? Eventually, that was not a very high priority for the Taskforce, but I
think that it is a very high priority. Using myself as an example and being
a refugee myself in the same position they are, getting a drivers license
and a car was the number one priority for me. But again if you set the goal
of getting a driver’s license for every employable refugee, it’s going to be
a lot of money that has to be invested. Therefore [the final report left] it
up to the individual and focused more on training and something that is
doable.
The final report reflected a compromise between the two viewpoints by recommending
simply that the state driver’s manual and written driving tests that were originally
translated into Hmong in the 1990s be revised and re-translated into Hmong and
distributed across the state.
Narrative Constraints
Any sort of structure inherently limits possibilities. However, lack of structure
can also mean lack of effectiveness, and therefore also lead to limits. The limits placed
on the Taskforce were not inevitable or fated. Instead, they were the result of choices
made by individuals. These choices put constraints on the nature of the dialogue that
took place within the Taskforce, and ultimately affected the final report and policy
recommendations that the Taskforce made.
As discussed above, the Governor’s list of objectives affected the direction that
the Taskforce took. However, these objectives were only a broad outline of information
to be addressed by the Taskforce. The manner in which these objectives were met was at
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the discretion of the Taskforce. Both the taskforce chair, Kaying Xiong, and the State
Refugee Coordinator, Sue Levy, exercised considerable power over the manner in which
the Taskforce operated. Together, they scheduled and planned for the meetings, which
included the length and frequency of full Taskforce meetings and the creation of each
meeting agenda. Additionally, the chair facilitated each meeting and thus controlled the
length of discussion on a particular topic.
A Typical Taskforce Meeting
As stated previously, five taskforce meetings were held between July 21, 2004
and February 23, 2005. Four took place in Madison, Wisconsin and one took place in
Wausau, Wisconsin. The meetings lasted three to four hours and were arranged by the
State Refugee Coordinator and her staff. Prior to the meetings, name cards were placed
around the conference tables that were arranged in a circle by staff members, leading
participants to sit where they were assigned. Additionally, extra seating was available at
every meeting for presenters, ad hoc members, and the public.
The meetings began with an update from the State Refugee Coordinator about the
number and location of Hmong refugees that had arrived in the state to date.
Additionally, she discussed funding issues and upcoming grant opportunities. This
update was followed by presentations from state agencies about topics that could affect
the taskforce recommendations. For example, at the third meeting a representative of the
Department of Public Instruction discussed ESL financial support and the way Hmong
students who arrived late in the school year would be counted for federal funding
purposes. At the second taskforce meeting, representatives from WHEDA discussed
housing resources in the state. During the initial taskforce meeting in July, a team of
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teachers who had visited the wat in Thailand presented information about the educational
background of the Hmong refugees. According to the State Refugee Coordinator, these
speakers were chosen by her and her staff. If a committee requested information about a
particular topic, she would find someone to present information. Otherwise, she chose
presenters based upon topics that she felt were important.
Each taskforce meeting also included an update from each committee chair about
the ongoing prioritization of issues within each committee. Typically, the meetings also
provided 30 to 60 minutes for committee meetings. Because I was involved with three of
the committees, it was difficult for me to divide my time and still maintain a presence on
each committee. Similarly, several taskforce members participated in two committees.
During interviews, they discussed the difficulty that these committee meetings posed for
them because they missed key discussions that took place during this time in some of the
committees.
Taskforce meetings usually ended with a group discussion about future steps for
the Taskforce. Initially, this involved discussion about committee deadlines and
reporting protocols. In later meetings, this time was spent discussing how the final report
would be presented and ways in which the taskforce could follow-up on its policy
recommendations to monitor implementation.
As with any group, some members dominated discussion while others were
quieter. However, I noted that during the taskforce meetings, several members never
spoke at all. This was particularly true of some of the Hmong men on the Taskforce.
Individual interviews with these members revealed that they either felt that they had
nothing to add to the discussion or expressed their opinions during committee meetings
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and felt that the committee chairs could adequately represent their views during taskforce
meetings. Additionally, during full taskforce meetings, members typically, though not
exclusively, limited their comments to topics that fell within the issue area of their
committees. As a result, there was little cross-committee discussion of issues.
Committee Constraints
During the first taskforce meeting on July 21, 2004, members brainstormed about
issues that would affect the incoming refugees. These issues were then grouped into six
categories that became the six committees of the Taskforce: Health, Family Issues,
Housing and Transportation, Economics, Mental Health, and Education. Members were
asked to choose a committee, and volunteers within these groups became committee
chairs. These workgroups met outside of the larger taskforce meetings, at the discretion
of the chairs. During each full taskforce meeting, committee chairs presented a five-toten minute summary of the issues that their group was tackling. I believe that this was
meant to be a time for other taskforce members to comment on these issues and make
suggestions to the committees. However, little feedback was given during these
presentations. The policy recommendations of the Taskforce came directly from this
committee work.
Mancur Olson’s (1965) classic study of group size and cooperation found that
smaller groups are more effective than larger groups for two main reasons. First, in small
groups, non-participation is more obvious, forcing members to contribute. Second,
because there are fewer perspectives, it is easier to reach agreement upon common goals.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Taskforce divided into smaller workgroups to
develop recommendations in particular policy areas. As one MAA director explained,
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“when you want to get things done, you don’t get too many people involved. If you get
too many, then you have conflict.”
Once the brainstorming session was completed and taskforce members had joined
the six committees, these workgroups and their division of issues became a “natural” part
of the Taskforce. Because some issues spanned across this categorization, it made
coordinated discourse difficult. For example, childcare is both a family and an
employment-related issue. English language training is an education and an employment
issue. Within the Hmong culture, wellness spans both physical and mental health.
Additionally, the categorization caused the taskforce members to narrow their perspective
to these six topic areas. As a result, issues that fell outside of the range of these six
categories could not exist within the Taskforce’s discourse.
During open-ended interviews conducted prior to the formation of the Taskforce,
I interviewed community leaders expected to be involved with the new Hmong refugees.
These leaders raised issues relating to the new refugees with which they had concerns.
The Taskforce committee discussion included many of these issues such as the lack of
affordable large family housing, job orientation needs, and the decrease in public
assistance allowances. However, other issues that these leaders raised fell outside of
these narrowly defined committee categories, such as the need for prenatal care, the high
rate of teen marriage and pregnancy within the Hmong community, pressure on anchor
relatives, and youth integration with the “Americanized” Hmong youth. Because they
did not fall under the purview of these six topics, they were not discussed.
The committee chairs controlled the frequency and type of interaction that their
committees had about the issues. Each of the three committees in which I participated
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operated quite differently. One committee conducted a conference call every three weeks
throughout the duration of the Taskforce. A second committee only had two conference
calls outside of full taskforce meetings. The third committee conducted conference calls
every four-to-six weeks and had a full-day, face-to-face meeting early in the Taskforce
timeframe to explore the issues. The committee chairs also exercised considerable power
over the recommendations that their workgroup produced.
Most taskforce members felt that they were able to express their opinions and
affect the recommendations that their workgroup produced. However, several members
in one of the committees felt that the chair wrote the recommendations for their
committee with almost no input from other members. One member described the
situation: “We had almost no discussion. That was what was really my big concern or
regret. Our chairperson was going to get us together in a conference call, and it never
happened. I fell behind because, in waiting for the chair to convene us again, I didn’t put
forth anything. And all of a sudden, time was up and we hadn’t met again.” Other
members of this same committee also felt that important issues were not addressed in the
recommendations because they never got the chance to discuss them. As one member
said, “[the chair] pretty much wrote the whole thing.” Interestingly, in an interview, the
chair told me that “pretty much the whole committee was in agreement” about the policy
recommendations. These interviews revealed that without guidelines for how to conduct
the workgroups, some issue areas were inadequately discussed.
As shown above, the simple act of breaking into committees constrained some
potential narratives. By establishing policy categories, issues that did not fall within
these six areas became extraneous. Additionally, the power that the committee chairs
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exercised over the amount and type of discussion also affected which topics received the
most attention in the final report. The full taskforce did not revisit the issues raised in the
initial brainstorming session that lead to the creation of the six committees. Instead, each
committee was solely responsible for prioritizing issues that fell within its area. By
returning to the initial list before a draft form of the final report was created, the
Taskforce may have considered more of these issues that fell outside the narrow confines
of the committee discussion.
Time Constraints
Time caused constraints on the narrative and on the Taskforce’s effectiveness in
three ways. First, some members felt that the short duration of the Taskforce did not
allow enough time for issues to be investigated and debated fully. Second, the timeframe
of the Taskforce did not correspond with the state budget cycle. As a result,
recommendations that would have required legislative action were not even considered in
the 2006 budget negotiations. Finally, when the taskforce first convened, the first
refugees had already arrived.
By the time the final report was released in February 2005, more than 70 percent
of the expected Hmong had already been resettled. In practical terms, this made some of
the taskforce recommendations, such as an orientation program for new refugees and
their host families, irrelevant. The state, through a federally funded grant, did eventually
implement a series of orientation sessions in some communities beginning in fall 2005,
more than a year after many of the refugees had arrived. However, these workshops were
focused on more long-term needs and not on pre-arrival coordination with the anchor
family that the Taskforce recommendation had stressed.
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This timeline also played into the struggle between short-term and long-term
resettlement issues discussed previously. As one member explained, “I think this
taskforce is too little, too late for the Hmong. We should have been doing this beginning
in January [2004] …when you’re planning recommendations, it helps if you can have
those recommendations made before two-thirds of the population has already arrived.”
Because of this timing, some members were more inclined to focus on long-term issues
that affect the entire Hmong population rather than targeting recommendations
specifically at the new refugees. This affected the three policy change approaches
discussed previously and outlined in Table 1.
Macro Constraints
The political and economic climate in Wisconsin played a significant role in the
Taskforce’s recommendations. As discussed previously, the social service networks that
had been in place for the Hmong began to deteriorate in the late 1990s when no new
Hmong were immigrating to the United States. This was an unexpected resettlement that
threatened to strain local and state resources.
One taskforce member explained that “this influx of refugees is coming at a time
when all the supports that had been built have really been decimated as far as the
economic resources.” Another member explained, “We’ve had a lot of lost jobs, and
people struggling.” A third member called the issue of affordable housing “political
dynamite.” Trying to find housing for the new refugees was very difficult when “there
are years-long waiting lists for low-income, homeless people to get housing subsidies.”
This economic environment put additional focus on equating employment with selfsufficiency as discuss previously.
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As most taskforce members explained, the State had a large budget deficit and
funding for social service programs had decreased dramatically over the previous five
years all across the state. Additionally, the new refugees were only going to be resettled
in about twenty communities in Wisconsin. One taskforce member speculated that state
representatives from the other parts of the state would not support programs that would
have no impact on their own constituents.
A committee chair explained that in this economic climate, making
recommendations for expensive new programs was unrealistic: “There are places we
don’t go with our thought process because where would we get the money to do
something like that?” Another taskforce member discussed the frustration of making
recommendations with no guidance from the Governor’s office about budget decisions.
“We had no idea how any recommendation would be paid for. That makes it difficult to
ask for things and still be seen as credible in a budget situation as serious as
Wisconsin’s.” Participant-observation of the committees and individual interviews
revealed that funding was one of the largest constraints on ideas and recommendations.
In interviews, other participants also talked about making “actionable”
recommendations. For example, members of the mental health committee felt
constrained by the lack of bilingual, bicultural mental health professionals in the state.
Similarly, a member of the education committee talked about the advantage of bilingual
education and how much the committee would have liked to recommend an increase in
the number of bilingual teachers in classrooms. However, these professionals did not
exist. As she explained, “you don’t go there because you know it’s not a possibility.”
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Without an infrastructure equipped to provide particular services, the Taskforce was
constrained in the types of recommendations it could make.
The Role of Organizations and Individuals
Taskforce members had a variety of reasons to be personally concerned about the
policy discourse that the group constructed. If enacted, the Taskforce’s recommendations
would not only affect the arriving Hmong, but also the organizations that would aid the
newcomers in their adjustment to life in Wisconsin. Therefore, the final report was a
blueprint for both the new refugees and for the organizations and individuals responsible
for helping them. Because the Taskforce was composed of individuals who would be
responsible for implementing many of the proposals, members had a direct stake in the
way problems were framed and solutions proposed. This is not to say that the taskforce
members manipulated discussion and recommendations out of self-interest. However, it
is important to note that the taskforce report potentially affects not only the lives of the
new Hmong refugees, but the lives of the people involved in the policy process.
Ideal and Real Resettlement Roles
The final report of the Taskforce includes a two-page description of the “ideal”
relationship among resettlement agencies, the federal government, state and county social
service agencies, the Office of Refugee Resettlement, and the Hmong mutual assistance
associations (MAAs). It is useful to differentiate between the “ideal” and the “real” in
these relationships. By ideal, I am not referring to a perfect system, but instead to the
way in which the resettlement policy discourse defines these relationships.
Anthropologists differentiate between ideal and real culture. “The ideal culture consists
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of what people say they should do and what they say they do” (Kottak and Kozaitis
2003:19). Real culture is what people actually do, as observed by the anthropologist.
Because I was unable to observe program implementation at these organizations, I
did not directly observe the “real” system. However, through the interviews and
participant-observation during the committee meetings, I learned that there was confusion
among taskforce members about the roles of these various organizations in a
resettlement. Despite an “ideal” system described in the final report, taskforce members
explained that these roles are not so clearly defined. One member stressed the
importance of “a general understanding of what happens to people when they get here.
Who facilitates all of that?” Another member explained her agency’s difficulty in
answering that question:
We had to learn what each agency saw their roles and responsibilities as
being. That was very unclear when this whole refugee resettlement
process started. Our staff thought that the volags, that had the contract
with the federal government, were responsible for much more than they
actually are. So we learned that pretty quickly and had to change our
expectations.
Through the process of the Taskforce, some members gained a better understanding the
roles of these organizations in a resettlement.
The report also reflects the large MAA presence on the Taskforce. For example,
the employment section of the final report states that “success [of this proposal] depends
upon the proven leadership and active participation of mutual assistance association
staff” (2005:12). Additionally, all six committee sections of the final report
recommended active partnerships with MAAs. One Hmong association executive on the
Taskforce felt that this was a positive step for these organizations: “The MAAs are
mentioned frequently and time after time in the report. It certainly encourages or
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suggests that all resettlement efforts in the State should be working closely with the local
MAAs in order to be effective in helping those serving refugees.” However, another
taskforce member described sections of the report as “somewhat self-serving to the
Mutual Assistance Associations”. Though this taskforce member felt that the MAAs play
an important role in resettlement, he worried that creating special programs for the
Hmong would take funding away from other populations and cause political tension for
the Hmong. He explained, “any time you single out a population for special funding and
you have other people throughout the state in very similar situations, you’re asking for
trouble.” In spite of this hesitation, the majority of taskforce members stressed the
importance of MAAs. Phrases such as “crucial” and “vital” were used repeatedly when
describing the role that MAAs should play in a resettlement. Through participant
observation and the individual interviews, it became apparent that in Wisconsin, the
Hmong MAAs have become the key organizations to delivery services to the Hmong
population.
Usage with Other Refugee Populations
In many interviews, taskforce members, both Hmong and non-Hmong, expressed
the hope that the taskforce report and its policy recommendations could be used for the
resettlement of other refugee populations. For example, the Refugee Health Coordinator
said, “I saw a broader implication beyond the Hmong refugee resettlement because…we
anticipate that we’re going to see future refugee resettlement efforts and … anything
developing out of this taskforce should have applicability no matter what refugee
population we’re going to be working with in the future.” A Hmong member hoped that
“whatever recommendations we make can be applied to other populations as well.” An
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MAA director said, “Hopefully this process won’t be used only for the Hmong but for
any new arrivals who come to the state.” Participant-observation revealed, however, that
other refugee populations were almost never discussed, and the applicability of these
recommendations to other populations was not a factor in the way that they were
constructed.
Several taskforce members explained that the recommendations would be
applicable to other populations because all refugees face similar needs in terms of
employment, housing and health. Additionally, one taskforce member explained that
“the barriers to service” are similar for all refugee populations. For example, “issues of
finances, of transportation, of language, of adequate translation and interpretation and
then the cultural barriers.” Another taskforce member expressed similar thoughts:
If we had a large influx of say Somalis, I think it would be very applicable
to use some of the same recommendations and thought processes for any
group of people, because none of this is really specific to just Hmong
families. A lot of it was just the basic things like housing and education
and healthcare, and all people need that. I think it would be very
applicable to any group that comes in, with a little bit of tweaking.
While the problems that all refugees face are similar, the solutions are not so
universal. The solutions proposed in the taskforce report require an established, ethnicspecific resettlement infrastructure to provide bicultural, bilingual services. When
examined independent of the entire document, many recommendations would positively
impact any refugee population. However, the final report stresses service delivery
through the MAAs and through bilingual, bicultural providers. The only MAAs in the
state of Wisconsin are Hmong. In recent years, a few of the MAAs have included
programs for other ethnic groups. For example, one MAA had a Russian-speaking
caseworker for a few months to aid refugees from the former Yugoslav states. Another
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MAA runs a housing program that serves both the mainstream population and the Hmong
in the community. However, these are exceptions. Most MAAs are entirely focused on
the Hmong in their communities. The taskforce report relies heavily on the role of
MAAs in resettlement and the need for bicultural, bilingual service provision. In
Wisconsin, these two provisions are currently only possible for the Hmong population.
Therefore, the very things that make these recommendations appropriate for the Hmong
make them unrealistic for the resettlement of other populations in Wisconsin without
considerable alteration. However, in other states that do have a significant infrastructure
of MAAs for other refugee groups, these recommendations could be quite useful.
Intended and Unintended Outcomes
This study was not designed to be an evaluation of the merit and worth of the
Taskforce and its recommendations. Additionally, this was not an evaluation of the
implementation of these recommendations. Instead, this study was intended to be an
ethnography of the process through which the Taskforce created its recommendations. In
the following section, I discuss how the policy process itself was productive. I divide this
accomplishment into three categories. First, the Taskforce itself created real-time
feedback loops for at least one of the committees, which aided in the resettlement of these
new Hmong refugees, irregardless of the committee’s recommendations. Second, the
announcement of the Taskforce worked as a catalyst in some communities for local
action. Third, the existence of the Taskforce was important politically for the Hmong
community.
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Taskforce as Successful Process
In some ways, the taskforce meetings and committee work itself helped the
taskforce members in this resettlement. When refugees first arrive in the United States,
they receive a health screening in the local community to assess any communicable
diseases or long-term health problems that they may have. Because Hmong were coming
to so many different communities, this was very difficult to coordinate. Due to the
timeframe of the Taskforce, these screenings occurred while the Health Committee was
active. The committee meetings became a forum for the coordination of these screenings
and to disseminate information about communicable diseases that were being identified
among some of the refugees. This helped health workers to revise the screenings so that
they would be more effective.
Additionally, several taskforce members spoke of increased communication and
information-sharing in other areas. One member said that “being in the same room with
people and trying to have a uniform service delivery across Wisconsin” was the most
helpful part of the Taskforce for him. Another member agreed: “Cooperation among
agencies seems to be improved when you have such a group come together to share
information, ideas, and suggestions.” The taskforce process was useful, not necessarily
based on the originality of the ideas it created, but because it established a consensus
around a set of ideas.
Catalyst for Local Action and Cooperation
Other taskforce members described the Taskforce as a catalyst that either
encouraged or organized preparation for the Hmong on a local level. For example, one
taskforce member explained that in his community the publicity produced by the
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Taskforce was important because it “allow[ed] our public to know that this was
happening…so that people know that there is a concerted effort.” Similarly, an MAA
director expected that the Taskforce would “bring local initiatives together … people are
currently learning from their mistakes, and each agency is almost learning independently.
When this work is produced, I hope that locally it’s going to draw a lot of groups that are
already working in the resettlement effort to work together.” Another taskforce member
said: “the taskforce report had some value in terms of alerting people to certain issues,
and helping facilitate things happening within the existing structure, within the existing
resources.” A fourth member said that she thought the existence of the Taskforce helped
to “mobilize the community. I think the community was interested in mobilizing itself
before the Taskforce, but I think the Taskforce helped focus. It put together a lot of
information and disseminated a lot of information and brought focus to issues.” As these
interviews revealed, the process of the Taskforce and the media attention that it generated
helped to organize local efforts and, again, created agreement about a set of ideas.
Political Significance to Hmong Community
In addition to advocating for an increased profile for the Hmong associations, the
final report also reflected the political significance of the Taskforce for the Hmong
community. The existence of the Taskforce was in itself an important political statement
for the Hmong in Wisconsin. One member described the Taskforce as “a coming of age”
for the MAAs and the Hmong community in Wisconsin. Many of the other taskforce
members echoed this sentiment. For example, one non-Hmong member stated, “Since
the Hmong were … deliberately a majority of the committee, it was their opportunity to
make a statement, to have all these folks look at them.” Another member stated that by
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commissioning the Taskforce, the Governor “recognizes the fact that there is a large
community of Hmong people in the Wisconsin area and there will be more.” Another
taskforce member expressed the hope that “as a result of the work that we’ve done,
policy-makers and the Governor and other people involved in decision-making would
really include the Hmong as full partners in planning and implementation of many of
these ideas and strategies.” As these quotations revealed, the Taskforce was an
affirmation for the Hmong members that they were considered a political force in
Wisconsin.
One Hmong leader eloquently summarized the importance of the Taskforce for
the Hmong:
Refugees have come to the point where they are also part of policymaking. I was not part of any sort of government policy in resettlement in
1975, ‘79, ‘80, ‘81. But if you look at today, all recommendations for
resettlement programs will involve the people who are former refugees.
So this report demonstrates that former refugees are not just refugees, but
they have become productive people in society. So therefore, refugees in
general are not a burden to society.
Interestingly, this quotation reinforces the economic focus of the dominant discourse in
the final report. This speaker equated the idea of political activism with being
“productive” and rather than being a burden.
The final report reflected this narrative of Hmong activism in several areas. The
Executive Summary contains the following sentence: “Bilingual, bicultural Hmong
leaders from WI communities must play a leading role in planning, implementing, and
overseeing these recommendations”(2005). In another section, the report urges that
“policy makers at all levels include the Hmong community as equal partners in the
further planning, implementation and evaluation of these recommendations” (2005:25).
Participant-observation of the taskforce meetings revealed that many Hmong members
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saw the Taskforce as an opportunity to solidify their political importance in Wisconsin.
Some members advocated a “Hmong desk” in the Governor’s office as a means to focus
attention on issues related to the Hmong. In the final report, this recommendation was
not included because many members felt that it fell outside of the purview of the
Taskforce’s mission.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis describes and analyzes the Governor’s Hmong Resettlement Taskforce in
Wisconsin as a cultural process. The goal of this study was to create dialogical
relationships with the taskforce members in order to understand how the
recommendations made in the final report were constructed. This is both the first known
anthropological study to examine a state’s refugee resettlement policy process and the
first to examine a statewide taskforce as a cultural process. As such, this thesis begins to
fill a gap in existing anthropological knowledge of policy formation.
This research project built upon the studies of Nader (1969), Wright (1995), and
Shore (2002; 1996; 1997), among others. I answered Laura Nader’s (1969) challenge to
anthropologists to study “up” and examine institutions and people in power rather than
solely concentrating on the subaltern. My unit of analysis, the 27-member taskforce, was
comprised of key state and local government officials, Hmong leaders, and community
activists. As Wright (1995) suggested, I uncovered embedded assumptions made by
taskforce members that affected their policy recommendations. This work also revealed
how both macro and procedural constraints limited the discussion and solutions proposed
by the Taskforce. This thesis produced a case study of the cultural process of policy
formation that can be used to inform communities involved in other refugee resettlements
and other types of taskforces.
The recommendations produced by the Taskforce were more than just a written
statement or list of goals and operating procedures. The final report was a cultural
product meant to affect peoples’ lives, created between people, for people, and used by
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people. As such, these policy recommendations were innately anthropological. As Shore
and Wright note, policies are "codifications of norms and values; charters for action;
blueprints for a future society and guides to conduct and practice” (1996:476). The final
report of the Taskforce contains a model of both how society should react to the new
refugees and how the new refugees should act within society (Shore and Wright 1996).
In this study, the definition of policy extended beyond simply legislators or
public executives. Policy is also negotiated at the levels of conception and
implementation. This study examined how the various members of the Taskforce defined
themselves and the incoming refugees within the policy arena and how these definitions
were manifested in the final recommendations of the Taskforce. Additionally, this thesis
studied constraints that affected the discussion and final narrative of the Taskforce, as
well as intended and unintended consequences of this policy process. This analysis of the
Taskforce contained six key findings.
Key Findings
First, resettling refugees is a long-term endeavor. However, the federal
resettlement policy structure creates a distinct separation between short-term and longterm resettlement needs. Though all taskforce members were aware of this division,
there was no full-group discussion about how to address this issue. Additionally, no
discussion about the group’s policy approach took place. As a result, some committees
created recommendations designed to overhaul the resettlement structure in the State.
Other recommendations focused on incremental changes within the present resettlement
structure. A third group of recommendations involved crisis management measures,
focused only on these arriving Hmong. The three policy change approaches coupled with
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the ingrained split between long-term and short-term needs left a blueprint for
resettlement that was, as one taskforce member called it, “somewhat disjointed.” A
group discussion at the first taskforce meeting about the type of approach necessary may
have lead to a more cohesive set of policy recommendations.
Second, the Taskforce operated with the underlying assumption that the Hmong
members could adequately represent the needs, experiences, and desires of the incoming
refugees and their host families. However, the background and refugee experiences of
these newcomers were vastly different than that of the elite Hmong members of the
Taskforce. Additionally, the Hmong culture had not remained static, either in the United
States or in the Wat. Therefore, the Hmong members of the Taskforce had a different
definition of being Hmong than the new refugees. By questioning this assumption and
either interviewing or conducting site visits to MAAs and anchor family homes, the
taskforce members may have devised different strategies and prioritized needs
differently.
Third, the dominant Taskforce discourse defined refugee success in economic
terms, often equating self-sufficiency with employment. However, most members had a
much more encompassing view of success and self-sufficiency. As a result, some issues
became contentious, such as the importance of drivers licenses.
Fourth, the timing of the Taskforce had repercussions on the recommendations
that it could make. The timeframe did not coincide with the state budget cycle, ensuring
that the recommendations would not be considered for inclusion in the 2006 state budget.
Additionally, most of the refugees had already arrived in the state by the time the final
report was presented. A discussion within the Taskforce about this issue may have led to
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recommendations that would have made more sense given the resettlement timeframe.
For example, “Family Issues” is so encompassing that by concentrating on an orientation
plan for the new refugees, many issues were overlooked. However, because so many of
the refugees had already arrived by the time the recommendations were published, the
orientation plan created by the committee was inappropriate for satisfying the needs of
these refugees.
Fifth, the large Hmong membership on the Taskforce was important for several
reasons. The Taskforce itself was a statement that many members felt welcomed the
Hmong into the political arena of Wisconsin. As a result of this membership, the
recommendations stressed the importance of MAAs in a resettlement. However, because
of this stress, the recommendations would not be appropriate for other populations that do
not have the infrastructure that the Hmong have developed in Wisconsin.
Finally, the Taskforce had unintended positive consequences outside of the policy
recommendations. For at least one committee, the Taskforce meetings became a forum
for the coordination of resettlement efforts and provided real-time feedback loops to
improve the delivery of resettlement health services. In some communities, media
attention garnered by the Taskforce acted as a catalyst that encouraged and coordinated
preparation for the new refugees on a local level.
Implications for Applied Anthropology
Though this was not an applied project, this study has considerable practical
implications for the planning of future refugee resettlements. Preparation for an influx of
refugees is an important part of any resettlement policy structure. This research was a
case study that gave insight into how one state prepared for such an influx. Additionally,

82
the ethnographic data gathered uncovered how the various members of the taskforce
defined themselves and their organizations’ role in the resettlement process. This could
be of particular interest for other communities preparing for a similar resettlement. The
view that organizations have about their own role and the view of other agencies about
them are often at odds. The ways in which these views converge and diverge are
important in revealing overlaps and gaps in service provision for the new refugees.
By coupling the Wisconsin Hmong Resettlement Taskforce final report with this
analysis, other states that have a strong refugee services infrastructure could adapt these
policy recommendations to their own needs. Additionally, this study provides insight
into the division between long-term and short-term needs imposed by federal funding
schemes. This, together with the discussion of the definition of self-sufficiency, could be
used by resettlement agencies and MAAs to improve their programs and to align their
services more accurately with the needs of new refugees.
This study also has practical applications for future state or local taskforces. The
procedural and macro constraints upon the Taskforce revealed in this analysis could be
used to make future taskforces more effective. By evaluating the breakdown into
committees and being cognizant of the constraints created by this practical division could
make future taskforces more deliberate in creating these types of workgroups. Also, an
awareness and discussion of time as a constraint when a taskforce is convened could
prevent making inappropriate recommendations or missing the necessary budget cycle.
Strengths and Weaknesses of this Study
There were three main strengths to this research. First, I gained access to the
general taskforce meetings and its elite members and was able to participate in the
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committee meetings. Access can be one of the most difficult obstacles to conducting a
study of policy construction. Second, the combination of participant-observation, indepth interviews, and document analysis provided necessary triangulation in this study.
The highly structured taskforce meetings did not allow for much discussion. The
committee meetings were much more loosely run, however they were focused on a
particular policy issue. The interviews allowed me to uncover competing narratives and
other ideas. Third, by situating the Taskforce and its recommendations within the
broader national and international resettlement policy structure, within the Hmong
resettlement history, and within the history of the Wisconsin resettlement system, I was
able to show the reasons for some narratives to be constrained while others became
dominant.
However, this study also had some limitations. First, the Taskforce and its
members were located in Wisconsin, and I live in Georgia. This meant that some
interviews had to be conducted via telephone. Additionally, I was unable to attend a fullday Mental Health committee meeting held in Madison, Wisconsin in October 2004.
These factors could have adversely affected rapport-building, causing my informants to
be less open during interviews. Second, I did not meet or interview any of the incoming
refugees or their anchor families. Because the Taskforce similarly did not, I do not feel
that this adversely affected my analysis of the policy process. However, I think this
analysis may have been stronger if I had been able to include data to show how the
refugees and their anchor families prioritized needs.
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Implications for Future Research
This study has focused on the 27 members of the Hmong Resettlement Taskforce
and the cultural process through which they created policy recommendations about the
resettlement of new Hmong refugees for the Governor of Wisconsin. If I were to
continue research on this topic, I would trace the implementation of these
recommendations in Wisconsin. I would also conduct interviews with refugees and
anchor families in Wisconsin to compare the assumptions and priorities that the
Taskforce made about “the people” and “the problem” with input from the intended
beneficiaries of the recommendations. Additionally, a comparison of this taskforce with
another taskforce centered on a refugee resettlement in a different state could provide
additional insights into the obstacles for refugees and local resettlement workers created
by the national and international resettlement policy structure.
Through the course of this study, it also became apparent that more research is
needed in several areas. New methodologies are needed for attaining input from refugee
populations. Focus groups and surveys have not been effective in Wisconsin in the past.
Anthropologists could provide insights into new ways to obtain information about
priorities and needs of refugee populations. Additionally, few studies have explored
policy formation as a cultural process. This study has only been a small step toward
filling a large gap in anthropological knowledge.
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APPENDIX B. HMONG TASKFORCE INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
BACKGROUND
You work for _________. Could you tell me a little bit about that your organization, your
role there and how it relates to the Hmong population? How long have you worked there?
Do you work with other refugee or immigrant groups besides the Hmong?
On a personal level, how involved with the Hmong are you? How long? In what
capacity?
What do you think is the role of MAAs in resettlement?
TASKFORCE
How did you come to be on the taskforce? (original member?)
Have you been on other statewide taskforces? Details
What does being a member the taskforce mean to you, professionally/ personally?
In your opinion what do you see as the main goals of the taskforce as a whole?
What do you see as the potential? Do you think that potential will be realized?
How much time do you anticipate devoting to the taskforce? What type of activities do
you expect that to entail?
Who on the taskforce do you think has the most power?
What do you think was the governor’s motivation for convening this group?
Do you know most of the taskforce members? Have you worked with them in the past?
Are there any glaring omissions on the taskforce?
Which committee(s) are you on? Why? (Who chose? Why this one and not another?)
NETWORK ANALYSIS
Do you know most of the taskforce members? Have you worked with them in the past?
DEFINITIONS
In your opinion, how would you describe a “successful” resettlement?
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How would you define a successful refugee?
COMMUNITY NEEDS
How many Hmong live in _____? How many new refugees are you expecting?
What, in your mind, are the main issues/ gaps in services/ potential problems?
Do you think the taskforce has the ability/ potential to help with any of these problems
that you have named?
What impact, if any, do you think the taskforce will have on your community? The state?
The Hmong in general?
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APPENDIX C. THE FINAL REPORT OF THE TASKFORCE

Hmong Resettlement
Task Force

Report to Governor Doyle
February 2005

February 23, 2005
Governor Jim Doyle
115 East, State Capitol
Madison, WI 53702
Dear Governor Doyle:
I am pleased to present you with the final report of your Hmong Resettlement Task Force. Our
diverse panel of Hmong leaders, local political leaders and agency professionals have worked
diligently to help ensure that the new Hmong population is able to integrate as quickly as possible
into welcoming Wisconsin communities.
The Task Force has developed twenty, wide-ranging recommendations to help meet refugee
needs in education, employment, economic development, housing, transportation, family
strengthening, health, dental care and mental health. These recommendations follow two basic
strategies:

•

Fund proven, cost-effective programs designed to meet immediate needs. These include
funding for language instruction for children and adults, emergency housing assistance, job
skill training, orientation, and strengthening of health screening programs.

•

Develop and maintain culturally and linguistically competent services so that refugees may
access the full range of services available to all state residents. These include: adding
Medical Assistance reimbursement for interpreter services provided for a Medical Assistance
covered service; supporting culturally competent mental health programs; improving access
to dental care; maintaining domestic violence intervention programs which meet the needs of
underserved populations; case management, citizenship and other services for the elderly;
development of a comprehensive employment and housing pilot program which would quickly
lead to self-sufficiency and home-ownership; and translation of the drivers licensing education
materials and exam.

One of the strengths of the Hmong Task Force is that it includes a wide variety of Hmong leaders,
as well as dedicated individuals from partner agencies throughout the state. Active involvement of
the refugees and former refugees in the planning and delivery of services has been a hallmark of
the Wisconsin refugee service program, and one of its great assets. It is critical that the refugeerun mutual assistance associations, and other representatives of the Hmong community, continue to be active in the implementation of these recommendations.

Implementation of these recommendations will require some additional resources and a strong
commitment by state agencies to ensuring access to services. Some of these resources will be
sought from federal programs. However, implementation of some of these recommendations will
require that they be incorporated into the 2005-2007 biennial budget. The members of the Task
Force remain committed to meeting with you and your cabinet members, and with our legislative
representatives, to clarify the need for these program changes.
The members of the Task Force and I would like to thank you for this opportunity to come together to
initiate this project. The saga of refugees is a story of hope, motivated by a belief that they can
create a brighter future for their children. The Task Force shares this hope and belief, and a commitment to working with you to build that brighter future.
Sincerely,

Kaying Xiong
Chair of Hmong Resettlement Task Force
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State of Wisconsin
Governor’s Hmong Resettlement Task Force Report
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
During the past three decades, Wisconsin has become home for approximately 67,000 refugees and former refugees
from a number of countries, including 47,192 Hmong from Laos. Now a new wave of approximately 3,190 Hmong
refugees from Thailand will reunite with their families in approximately 20 counties throughout the state. These are
remnants of the thousands who fled in the aftermath of the Vietnam War in the mid-70’s. These new Hmong refugees
began arriving at the end of June 2004 and are expected to continue to arrive through April 2005.
Wisconsin has a long tradition of delivering successful resettlement services through a close partnership among state
and local governments, resettlement agencies, Mutual Assistance Associations, community based organizations and
volunteers. As a result, the Hmong refugees have successfully obtained jobs and become productive citizens of their
new communities. To ensure continued success for the new group, Governor Jim Doyle in June of 2004 created the
Hmong Resettlement Task Force to study the demographics and needs of the population and to make recommendations for changes in policy, activities, and partnerships among parties involved. The Task Force also brought in experts
from local communities and state agencies to help them develop recommendations for effective resettlement. The
recommendations put forth in this report are a combination of ideas and experiences gathered through a wide representation of private and public service providers, as well as former Hmong refugees in the state of Wisconsin.
The priority areas of need identified by the Task Force and recommendations to address those needs follow. Bilingual,
bicultural Hmong leaders from WI communities must play a leading role in planning, implementing, and overseeing
these recommendations. Their experience as former refugees, their understanding of current refugee issues, and their
cultural expertise are critical to success.
A. Education
• Adopt Department of Public Instruction’s Superintendent Burmaster’s 2005-07 budget proposal to increase
bilingual-bicultural categorical aids, fund all English Language Learners (ELL) in all districts, and provide full
funding for 4-year-old kindergarten.
•

Increase English as a Second Language funding for the Wisconsin Technical College System by $600,000 to
provide 44 additional course sections of 30 students each in the various impacted communities.

B. Employment
•

Provide in-depth orientation activities to help Hmong adults become comfortable in their new home communities
and prepare for employment.

• Develop short-term, bilingual skill training, which incorporates job-specific language training as needed, and
which is designed with employer input to meet local labor market needs. Include training that offers opportunities for
advancement and improvement in wages.

•

Fund limited-time, partial wage subsidies as employer incentive to hire and train refugee adults.

•

Create a Governor’s Blue-Ribbon Employer Advisory Committee using nominations from local mutual assistance
associations and other employment specialists, create an advisory group of employers from around the state who
have successfully hired, trained, retained, and promoted limited-English Hmong employees.

C. Housing and Transportation
• Increase Federal and State funding for housing assistance and Section 8 housing programs.
•

Create an emergency housing assistance program to prevent homelessness for refugees through a combination of
public and private resources.

•

WHEDA and other federal, state and local housing authorities should identify surplus properties which may be
available for rent to meet the current, urgent need for housing. WHEDA, HUD and government bodies obtain
ownership of housing through defaults on loans and taxes. These properties should immediately be identified and
utilized as temporary housing until this critical need for housing is resolved.

•

The Department of Transportation should revise and update the Wisconsin Hmong Drivers Manual and driver’s
test.

•

WHEDA and the DWD should collaborate to develop a comprehensive, model housing and employment programs
that will lead to stable employment and home-ownership.

D. Health and Dental Care
• Increase access to dental care for Medical Assistance clients and increase the number of dental providers
accepting Medical Assistance clients.
•

Provide funding for Medical Assistance reimbursement for interpreter services.

•

Link refugees, especially those who are uninsured, with programs and resources that promote health.

•

Build “surge capacity” into the public health system.

E. Family Strengthening
•

Provide comprehensive orientation programs to new families and their sponsor families.

•

Provide bilingual case management and interpretation services to ensure that refugees (especially vulnerable
elderly and disabled refugees) have access to the same services as other residents.

•

Assist elderly refugees to obtain citizenship and integrate into new communities.

•

Support continued funding for culturally and linguistically competent services for victims of family violence.

F. Mental Health
• Develop and sustain linguistically and culturally competent mental health services.

Wisconsin’s
Hmong Resettlement
Task Force Report

February 2005

Task Force Information
1. Background
Early in 2004 the Department of State (DOS) announced plans to resettle Hmong refugees
from Laos who have been living for many years in a compound on the grounds of a Buddhist
temple, the Wat Tham Krabok in Thailand. DOS has estimated that a total of 15,276 Hmong
would be admitted to the United States, including an estimated 3,190 for Wisconsin. As of
December 6, 2004 a total of 1,941 have actually arrived in the state. These new refugees are
expected to resettle in 20 counties (see Attachment 1). This resettlement effort could well be
the last opportunity for many of the Hmong currently living in Wisconsin to be reunited with
their relatives.
The Hmong are remnants of the thousands who fled to Thailand in the aftermath of the
Vietnam War. Hmong soldiers had fought on the American side in the war, destroying
Vietnamese supply routes, rescuing American pilots, and fighting the Communist Pathet Lao.
When the communist government took over Laos, Hmong fled their homeland in the face of
genocide. More than 150,000 Hmong refugees were settled in the United States between
1975 and 1988. The refugees in the Wat fled to Thailand, but have not been able to resettle
until now. Some have been in the refugee camps in Thailand for more than two decades.
They have had an uncertain future for a generation. Through pressures from the Thai
government and Hmong family members in the United States, the United States Department
agreed to resettle all who were qualified and interested in coming to the U.S. and passed
security and drug screenings.
DOS planned to have the majority of the population resettled within the 2004 calendar year;
so statewide planning efforts accelerated throughout the year. The Wisconsin Department of
Workforce Development has been working closely with the U.S. Department of State and the
local voluntary resettlement agencies to obtain the most accurate possible information on the
Hmong population in the Wat, and on their anticipated arrival in Wisconsin.
2. Task Force Charge
In June of 2004, Governor Jim Doyle created this Hmong Resettlement Advisory Task Force.
He charged it with specific tasks to advise the Governor and the Department of Workforce
Development Secretary, Roberta Gassman, on matters relating to the resettlement of the new
Hmong refugees from Thailand.
Members of the Task Force play a crucial role in this effort. They will monitor and coordinate
resettlement efforts and recommend additional steps that the Administration and local
communities can take to ensure success.
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The specific charge is a follows:
•
•
•
•
•

Study the data about the Hmong population, and learn about their demographics,
distribution and needs;
Examine the efforts of DWD, WHEDA, DHFS and local private and public agencies
in the resettlement process;
Provide a link to Hmong communities so that local agencies and individuals can have
their voices heard by policy makers in the Capitol;
Make recommendations for changes in policy, new activities, and partnerships to
improve the resettlement process; and
Tell the story of the Hmong in Wisconsin as a success story in the history of
Wisconsin.

3. Task Force Members

2

Kaying Xiong, Chair

Locust Lane Elementary School, Eau Claire

Members
Nell Anderson
Andrew Benedetto
Phyllis Bermingham
Melissa Borth
Susan Gundlach
Boungning Her
Sharon Hunter
Dan Idzikowski
Mary Ann Jackson
Yang Max Kue
ThajYing Lee
Cheryl McIlquham
John Medinger
Yee Moua
Jim Schramm
Hoyu Sayaovong
Joe Vang
Ker Vang
Shwaw Vang
Thai Vue
Ann Wondergem
Bee Xiong
Christa Xiong
Shoua N. Xiong
ChaSong Yang
Peter Yang

Wausau School District
Children’s Service Society of Wisconsin
Wausau Area Hmong Mutual Association
ThedaCare at Home
Lutheran Social Service of Wisconsin
Milwaukee Area Technical College
Department of Public Instruction
Catholic Charities of the Diocese of La Crosse
Wisconsin Technical College System
Manitowoc Police Department
United Refugee Services of Wisconsin
Department of Health and Family Services
Mayor, City of La Crosse
Wisconsin Housing and Economic Development Authority
Mayor, City of Sheboygan
Hmong First Baptist Church
Fox Valley Job Service
Hmong Association of Green Bay
Madison School Board
La Crosse Area Hmong Mutual Assistance Association
Sheboygan Health and Human Services
Green Bay Police Department
Xiong & Associates
Lao Family Community, Inc
Hmong Mutual Assistance Association of Sheboygan
Wausau Area Hmong Mutual Association

4. Task Force Meeting History
The Task Force has been meeting since July 2004. The group discussed six basic but
important areas of need that they felt warranted immediate attention from service providers
and government agencies. Members of the Task Force then separated into six different
subcommittees in order to work more efficiently within each area of need. (See Attachment
2—Subcommittee Members and Areas of Need.) The subcommittees met outside of the
larger task force meetings to discuss best practices, to identify the resources currently
available, and to further develop ideas on recommended solutions around each issue. Each
subcommittee also invited individuals from their communities who had expertise in a specific
area to work with the subcommittee. The Task Force also sought the advice and expertise of
several groups such as the Department of Public Instruction, WHEDA, and Health and Family
Services to assist in the process of working through each area of need. As a result, the
recommendations put forth in this report are a combination of ideas and experiences gathered
through a wide representation of private and public service providers, as well as former
Hmong refugees in the state of Wisconsin.

“It has been a humbling experience to
work with so many dedicated and caring
community members throughout
Wisconsin to ensure that our newest
Hmong families have a welcoming and
smooth transition to their new homes.”
Kaying Xiong,
Hmong Resettlment Task Force Chair
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Overview of the Refugee
Resettlement Program
1. Plan for Successful Resettlement
Resettlement is accomplished through a public/private partnership. The U.S. Departments of
State and Homeland Security determine who will be admitted to the country. The Department of
State then contracts with 10 private voluntary agencies for the resettlement. The agencies that
do resettlement in Wisconsin include Catholic Charities, Lutheran Social Services, International
Institute of Wisconsin and Jewish Family Services.
These voluntary agencies, also known as VOLAGS, form the backbone of the resettlement
program. They have a long experience in the resettlement of refugees from many nations.
These agencies use their existing local organizational networks to recruit volunteers, arrange
transportation, help locate housing, employment, food and clothing, and other supportive
services. VOLAGS have a grassroots, community network that has made it possible to resettle
more than a million refugees nationwide, largely on a voluntary basis. They rely heavily upon
the local anchor families, who provide a support system for the new arrivals.
The Departments of Workforce Development and Public Instruction receive grants from the
federal Office of Refugee Resettlement in the Department of Health and Human Services to
provide refugee-specific assistance and services through local agencies and schools.
The Department of Workforce Development is providing additional resources to local
communities. Current refugee-specific services include cash and medical assistance for single
adults (for the first eight months after arrival), employment and training services, mental health,
health screening, elderly and youth services, and programs to prevent domestic violence.
The Department has:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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expanded employment and training services in key resettlement communities and
developed an integrated employment system based on skilled, bilingual job developers
who work closely with each family;
allocated nearly $2 million to provide W-2 services to new refugees and met with W-2
agencies and refugee service providers to ensure coordinated service delivery;
provided more than $1.6 million in health screening contracts with public health agencies in
all affected communities;
strengthened mental health services;
expanded Refugee Family Strengthening Services using Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families funds;
developed communications and training for Income Maintenance and W-2 staff to ensure
they are prepared for new caseloads; and
participated in listening sessions sponsored by Senator Kohl to identify and respond to
community needs.

DWD staff are collecting, reviewing and replicating bilingual materials to support local
orientation programs offered by refugee service providers in health, employment, education
and nutrition to help refugees rapidly adjust to Wisconsin life. Training is being provided to
expand the pool of qualified medical interpreters. Culturally competent childcare resources
are being identified.
The Department of Public Instruction (DPI) obtained a Fulbright grant to send a delegation of
educators to Thailand to assess the educational needs of the children, review Thai
educational systems and develop curriculum for use in Wisconsin schools. Over the last
several years, the DPI has been supporting training for bilingual teachers and principals, so
that nearly every affected school is equipped with highly trained, bilingual teachers,
counselors and some Hmong administrators.
The Department of Health and Family Services Refugee Health Coordinator has met with
public health agencies throughout the state, providing technical assistance and training so that
local agencies will be prepared to conduct health education and screening. Other staff are
preparing information to ensure that county income maintenance staff efforts will be
well
coordinated with other local agencies. The Community Action Agency
network is also being mobilized to serve this population.
The Wisconsin Technical College System (WTCS) and DWD staff have met with the Deans of
Adult Basic Education for the local technical colleges to help ensure that language and other
training programs are available as refugees arrive. The WTCS annual ABE/ESL conference
featured training on serving students with limited literacy skills, to prepare technical and
community based agency teachers.
Staff from several members of the congressional delegation, DWD, the Governor’s Office and
local community providers are working to develop a joint funding strategy. Senator Feingold,
Senator Kohl and Congressman Obey have been very helpful in discussing Wisconsin’s
needs with the Office of Refugee Resettlement and in securing enhanced refugee service
funding in 2005.
2. Local Communities Respond
Private voluntary resettlement agencies arrange for the refugees to arrive and provide for
their initial resettlement needs. They help coordinate an array of community services which
support refugees. Refugees are eligible for state and community services on the same
basis as other residents, and therefore have a wide variety of resources to help them
succeed. A number of elementary, secondary, university and vocational colleges have
bilingual staff to help serve the new refugees. County social/human services agencies assist
with social services, and with medical assistance, food share and other assistance programs.
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County social/human service agencies provide mental health and other needed counseling
services. Local W-2 agencies provide financial assistance and employment and training
services. The local W-2 providers partner with other agencies to ensure coordination of ESL,
transportation and other necessary services. Bilingual staff and/or paid interpreters are part of
the social/human/income maintenance agency(ies) system. Health screenings, immunizations
and follow-ups are provided by many local public health agencies to help refugees get
needed health care and prevent the spread of communicable diseases. Bilingual health aides
are available in many impacted communities throughout the state.
Refugee self-help organizations, the Mutual Assistance Associations (MAAs), provide services
to help refugees become self-sufficient. They help refugees integrate into the community by
providing employment-related services, educational services, bilingual support, advocacy,
orientation, community relations and education, and cultural preservation. They form a natural
support system in more than a dozen communities from across the state with large Hmong
populations. They are becoming key resources centers and are funded by federal, local and
foundation dollars.
Throughout the state thousands of anchor family members and volunteers have contributed
time, money and goods to help the new arrivals. Warehouses are full of furniture and clothing
that have been donated. Cash donations have helped families obtain rental housing.
Sponsors and other volunteers are teaching refugees everything from how to ride the bus to
how to speak English.
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Wisconsin has a strong system of national, state and local partnerships. Its spirit of
community and high quality, culturally competent services have helped the Hmong who
currently live here to rapidly achieve success. We anticipate that these new families will soon
join their relatives in enriching Wisconsin’s cultural and economic fabric.
3. Demographics and Needs
During the past three decades, the Hmong have resettled in more than a dozen Wisconsin
communities. Because of family reunification, these communities will also become home to
the new group of Hmong. The Department of Workforce Development estimates that in July
2004 there were a total of 66,872 refugees, former refugees and children of refugees in
Wisconsin: 57,735 of these were Southeast Asians, of whom 47,192 were Hmong. (This
estimate reflects contiued population growth since the 2000 census.) There were 9,137
refugees from the former Soviet Union, Former Yugoslavia, Africa and other parts of the world.
These Hmong refugees and former refugees have become very successful. They have a
median household income of $36,000, less than 1% of households receive W-2 assistance,
and more than 55% of families own their own homes. Hundreds of businesses in Wisconsin
are owned by Hmong. (See Attachment 3 for more Census Data on the Hmong.)
As mentioned earlier, the Department of State has estimated that approximately 3,190 Hmong
from Thailand will resettle throughout the state. The majority of these new refugees will
resettle in the communities that currently have larger Hmong populations.
This resettlement represents a significant increase over recent resettlement efforts, although it
is consistent with the peak resettlement rates of the early 1990s. In each of the past two
years, Wisconsin resettled less than 250 refugees. During State Fiscal Year 2005, Wisconsin
expects to resettle an estimated 3,190 new Hmong and approximately 300 other refugees.
This will be more than ten times our normal arrival rate.
According to Department of State, the new Hmong are an exceptionally young population, with
60% being under age 18. The chart below indicates the ages of the total 15,276 eligible for
resettlement in the United States:
Age

Number

Percentage

0-3
4-14
15-18
19-24
25-44
45-64
Above 64

3,040
4,584
1,545
1,602
2,598
1,320
587

20%
30%
10%
10.11%
17.01%
9%
3.84%

TOTAL

15,276

100%
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Children have had some access to schools in the Wat and in the neighboring Thai village.
Approximately 50% of the children have attended school, but schooling is generally not
available beyond the 9th Grade.
School Statistics
•
•
•
•
•

Two formal schools (Thai or Hmong)
Half of camp children are in school
Half can’t afford school
9th grade maximum
37% of adults have formal education

The adults have limited education. They generally speak Hmong, some Thai, and some will
have limited English ability. Since the resettlement program was announced, the Hmong have
organized English classes in the Wat, but no formal instruction has been provided by the
United States or Thai governments. Many of the adults are not literate in any language.
However, for those who are literate, computers, cell phones and other western technologies
are available in the Wat. Approximately 40% of the adults have been working, primarily in
farming, sewing, small business, and quarrying. Many families have also been receiving
financial support from their families in the United States.
The typical family structure consists of large, patriarchal families in which polygamy, early
marriage, and authoritarian discipline patterns are common. To be economically viable in the
U.S., it will be necessary for both husband and wife to work, for families to postpone marriage
and child-bearing, and for them to develop new communication styles which will hold their
families together when they are no longer supported by strong cultural and social norms. All
of these factors require an extensive program of assistance to help families access services
and to cope with the substantial transformations which they will experience.
The Task Force identified several critical areas of need:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Employment and business development;
Affordable housing for large families;
Transportation;
Health, including dental health;
Mental health;
Education for both children and adults; and
Family support.

In every area, appropriate bilingual/bicultural access to program services is needed to enable
the refugees to fully participate in their community, and to provide a sense of dignity and
confidence in their ability to live independently.
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As Wisconsin gears up to address these needs, it has experienced a recent decline in
federal funding, which must be reversed. Refugees arrive as a result of federal foreign policy
decisions, and it is critical that the federal government provide the funding needed for the
refugees to quickly integrate into their new communities. At the same time, refugees are a part
of Wisconsin communities, and the state must ensure that its programs and services are
effective in meeting their needs.
Prior to the announcement of the Hmong resettlement, from CY 2003 to CY 2004 the state
experienced a 75% reduction in social services and Targeted Assistance Discretionary
program funding from the federal Office of Refugee Resettlement. Even though Wisconsin has
recently received an award of $675,500 under the Unanticipated Arrivals Grant for employment
services to the new Hmong arrivals from Thailand, Wisconsin’s refugee program continues to
face a major challenge to serve the existing refugee population in the state, including the new
arrivals.
Additional federal and state resources are needed to provide culturally and linguistically
appropriate services.
The following sections identify how the Task Force believes the state can most effectively
address the identified needs of the new refugees.
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Issues Identified and Recommendations
A. Education
What is the Issue?
By gathering culturally sensitive educational experts from around the state, the subcommittee
collected information, clarified needs, and identified best practices for the educational
concerns from Pre-K through adult. The Task Force examined educational strategies for
English Language Learners (ELLs), who also have limited literacy and academic skills (based
on several presentations about schooling in the Wat Tham Krabok). The research indicates
that it would take five to seven years for these ELLs to gain enough language to compete
academically with their peers. Early educational intervention, based on language development and pre-literacy skills with first language support, is one of the most successful ways to
secure language acquisition. Therefore, programs like 4-year-old kindergarten and Head
Start should be supported.
Many larger school districts have developed a framework for effective ELL programs. School
districts and the Department of Public Instruction have supported teacher training for the
Hmong, thereby securing a certified Hmong bilingual teaching staff. Instruction is content
based, accelerating language literacy development while enhancing academics.
Approximately 1,276 adults who are “unanticipated arrivals” from the Wat Tham Krabok will
require English language instruction. An additional 80-100 Somali Bantu adult refugees have
settled in Milwaukee this past year. These people are following the settlement patterns of
previous family members and thus we anticipate that each of nine WI Technical College
districts will receive 100—350 new ELL students. The technical college system, literacy
councils, community based organizations and university system have educated and
graduated a wide range of employable first and second generation Hmong individuals.
However, the number of foreign-born people in Wisconsin has increased by 60%, without an
increase in support for English language instruction, making it a challenge to serve the
existing ELL population in the state, with insufficient resources for these new arrivals. Implementation of the following recommendations will help these new refugees obtain rapid selfsufficiency.
Recommendation A1: Adopt Superintendent Burmaster’s proposed 2005-07 budget
proposal for the Department of Public Instruction.
This would increase bilingual-bicultural categorical aid to reimburse districts at a proposed
rate of 30 percent of eligible costs, which is a step up from the present 12 percent
reimbursement.
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Currently 39 districts provide reimbursable bilingual/bicultural programming, serving 23,021
students but 35,567 are in need of this service. This 2005-07 budget proposes funding for
all English Language Learners in all districts. The 2005-07 budget also offers: full funding for
4-year-old kindergarten; an increase in funding for SAGE programming; transportation
coverage for rural schools; and more flexibility and local control for districts under caps that
limit school spending. The Task Force believes that these proposed increases will
substantially improve the education of Hmong students.
Recommendation A2: Increase English Language Leaners (ELL) funding for the
Wisconsin Technical College System by $600,000.
Based on geographic distribution, which places students in various communities within a
district, we anticipate the need for 44 additional ELL course sections of 30 students each.
Thirty students is a high teacher/student ratio but even at this rate the total amount it would
cost to provide all of the necessary instruction would be in excess of $1million. This
recommendation is for additional funding for 23 sections serving 690 adult learners. The
Wisconsin Technical College System has applied for a grant for $469,000 with the Office of
Refugee Resettlement. If approved, that grant would satisfy a portion of this need but an
additional $600,000 would be required from other federal and state sources. (See
Attachment 4.) This would fund:
1. Twenty-three new ELL sections specifically for the new, preliterate refugees. New
refugees’ language needs are different from other ELL students and they will make
much better progress in classes designed specifically for them. These classes
would be taught by the existing network of vocational technical colleges, communitybased organizations and literacy councils.
•
•
•
•

Programs offer at least 15-20 hours of instruction per week with 30 students
per section depending on the location.
Students will learn language skills at the same time they are experiencing
community orientation activities related to health care, public schools,
finances, transportation, etc.
Career education and job skills will be provided and will also be interwoven
across the curriculum.
Classes will teach parents the skills that will help them be the main supporter
for their children’s education. This is important because we need to keep
the parents’ influence dominant in the families.

2. Required books, materials and testing. All students will be pre and post tested using
the BEST PLUS standardized test to assure accountability.
3. Training to volunteers, specialists and teachers to address the specific needs of
these refugees.
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B. Employment
What is the Issue?
Across Wisconsin, Hmong former refugees who were resettled in the late 1970s have become
an important part of the fabric of local communities. After initial struggles with language and
cultural differences, these families are now employed, home-owning, contributing community
members. Local Hmong mutual assistance associations, in partnership with other community
agencies, successfully created individualized employment training programs to meet local
needs for a productive workforce. Bilingual/bicultural employer relations specialists were a
key element of the most successful programs.
Today, as a new wave of Hmong families are being resettled in Wisconsin communities, a
great sense of urgency exists for rapid employment for the approximately 675 employable
adults. The average family consists of five individuals, but approximately 230 families consist of
six or more members who will have extraordinary costs for shelter, clothing, etc. Wisconsin’s
W-2 program provides both financial assistance and employment assistance to refugees and
other low-income families. It provides family payments of up to $673 per month for participating
families, and is not adjusted for family size. Because assistance is time-limited, it is essential
that families move quickly into employment. Only with employers as active planning partners
can the success of language and pre-employment skill training be assured. Employment of
these adults may result in increased post-employment training costs for a short time. However,
if funds can be obtained to partially reimburse these increased costs, many employers will
welcome the opportunity to fill job openings with these loyal, hard-working job seekers,
gaining long-term productivity while increasing workforce diversity.
Entry-level jobs will not meet these families’ long-term financial needs. Advanced language
training, other academic instruction, and further skill training must also be in place for these new
Wisconsin residents to reach the American dream of financial security, home ownership, and
continuing education.
Success depends upon the proven leadership and active participation of mutual assistance
association staff and other bilingual, bicultural employment specialists. Thus, mutual assistance
associations should be the fiscal agent and lead programmatic agency for these employment
and training activities, working in partnership and subcontracting as necessary with technical
colleges and other local employment and training organizations. With their bicultural/bilingual
leadership and their long-term record of success in other contracts with the Department of
Workforce Development for refugee services, mutual assistance associations are the natural
choice for these additional contracts and services.
The following recommendations are designed to ensure economic self-sufficiency as rapidly
as possible. Although these recommendations carry a price tag, long-term benefits will
outweigh initial costs. We request $2.4 million be designated to implement these
recommendations. Funding for these initiatives could include any combination of existing
employment and training resources (such as W-2 and Workforce Investment Act) and federal
refugee discretionary programs.
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Recommendation B1: Provide initial, intensive “surviving/succeeding in Wisconsin”
training.
Provide in-depth orientation activities to help these Hmong adults become comfortable in their
new home communities and, thus, able to concentrate on employment preparation. Minimum
content areas should include help in using public transportation; survival English; orientation to
Wisconsin’s world of work (job/career choices, employer expectations, successful job
seeking/keeping strategies, communicating with supervisors and co-workers); available
community resources; financial management; obtaining a driver’s license and the costs of
automobile ownership; and general information about western concepts about life-long learning,
self-esteem, motivation, and physical/mental health.
Recommendation B2: Provide short-term vocational skill training.
Design and implement intensive, short-term skill training programs that incorporate the specific
language and math skills necessary for that vocational area. These skill training and vocational
ELL programs must be designed with employer input to meet local labor market needs and
match trainees with specific existing and anticipated job openings. Work with employers to
obtain commitments to hire successful program graduates. The DWD and Workforce
Development Boards should extend this effort beyond the initial job placement by developing
linguistically appropriate skill training targeted at Limited English Proficient clients. This opens
advancement opportunities to refugees who have made it to the first rung of the employment
ladder. These efforts would be targeted at higher wage jobs, higher skill preparation,
vocational English, and workplace math and computer operation instruction.
Recommendation B3: Develop a wage subsidy program in partnership with local
employers.
Fund a limited-time, wage subsidy program as an employer incentive to hire and train these
adults. Encourage employers to reinvest part of the incentive payments to help fund advanced
workplace training opportunities. Provide on-going bilingual/bicultural support (job coaching,
communication assistance, problem solving, cultural brokering) to both employers and
employees.
Recommendation B4: Establish a Governor’s Blue-Ribbon Employer Advisory
Committee.
Using nominations from local mutual assistance associations, W-2 agencies, voluntary
resettlement agencies and other employment specialists create an advisory group of
employers from around the state who have successfully hired, trained, retained, and
promoted limited English Hmong employees. Utilize their expertise in on-going employment
preparation and advancement programs.
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C. Housing and Transportation
What is the Issue?
There is a serious lack of financial resources to provide housing assistance to the new refugee
families. This is especially true for large families where limited housing stock drives up rental
costs. There is also a shortage of affordable housing in nearly every resettlement community,
especially for large families. A serious and urgent effort is needed to address these issues.
The current W-2 cash benefit of $673 barely covers the average rental costs of $400-$750 per
month. Applicants for subsidized housing or Section 8 vouchers must wait many months or
even years in most resettlement communities. This issue affects nearly all of the 682 Hmong
refugee families, as well as many other refugees and other low-income families. Available
information indicates that approximately 60% of the families who have arrived to date are living
with anchor relatives in severely overcrowded situations, while 30% have moved into
unsubsidized housing which is either not affordable or is severely overcrowded or substandard
housing. This may cause unhealthy and unsafe living conditions for the refugee families. We
estimate that approximately 600 Hmong refugee families are in need of immediate assistance.
The Wisconsin Driver Manual in the Hmong language was produced in the 1990’s and needs to
be revised and updated. There is a high rate of failure among Hmong who take the
computerized driver’s licensure test, and the translation quality needs to be improved to reflect
contemporary Hmong language.
Recommendation C1: Increase Federal and State funding for housing assistance and
Section 8 housing programs.
Housing assistance for low-income families needs to be sustantially expanded in order to build
strong communities. Assistance should address both the short-term needs for rental housing
and the longer term need for home-ownership. Educational programs regarding financial literacy
and home maintenance support these long-term goals.
Recommendation C2: Create an emergency housing assistance program to prevent
homelessness for refugees.
Define “homeless or threatened with homelessness” within emergency housing programs
operated by WHEDA, the Housing and Urban Development and Workforce Development to
include the housing needs of the families who are homeless but not living in homeless shelters.
Extended families who are living together in unsafe or severely overcrowded situations that
violate leases need assistance in order to prevent both families from becoming homeless.
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Recommendation C3: WHEDA and other federal, state and local housing authorities should
identify surplus properties for immediate occupancy.
WHEDA, HUD and government bodies obtain ownership of housing through defaults on loans
and taxes. These properties should immediately be identified and utilized as temporary
housing until this critical need for housing is resolved.
Recommendation C4: WHEDA and the Department of Workforce Development should
collaborate to develop a model housing economic self-sufficiency program for refugees.
WHEDA, DWD and the resettlement agencies should conduct further research to identify the
exact dimensions of the housing need and identify the most critical communities of need.
They should work together with local housing systems and Mutual Assistance Associations
to develop a comprehensive model for moving refugees to employment and housing
independence.
Elements of this model (contingent upon available funding) would include initial rent subsidies,
skill training in carpentry and housing rehabilitation skills to provide both employment and
“sweat equity,” financial literacy training and individual development accounts to encourage
savings for home-ownership, and assistance through a first-time home-ownership program.
Through this comprehensive package of services, refugees could move from unemployment
and subsidized rental housing to financial independence and home-ownership. If successful,
this could provide a powerful model for helping other low-income populations develop a key
asset for independence, while improving low-income neighborhoods.
Recommendation C5: Ensure the
Drivers Manual and driving test are
available in high-quality translation.
The Division of Motor Vehicles should
revise and update the Wisconsin Hmong
Driver’s Manual and test and have them
reviewed by the Wisconsin United
Coalition of MAAs, which can provide
technical support and editing for the
Hmong translation.
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D. Health and Dental Care
What is the issue?
Health priorities for all refugees involve ensuring the safety of the public health through communicable disease screening and treatment, and maximizing the health of the individual
through the provision of culturally competent health care services. Culturally competent health
care incorporates not only the use of bilingual care providers or qualified medical interpreters,
but also sensitivity to the unique needs of individuals – i.e. awareness of life experience,
spiritual beliefs, health-beliefs, decision-making processes and communication styles. This
group of refugees faces similar barriers to heath care as those seen previously in Hmong and
other groups with Limited English Proficiency. They include language, transportation, financial
and cultural issues.
Overcoming these barriers requires communication, commitment, resources and time.
Communication and commitment is necessary amongst resettlement partners in the community
and within the government. To support this, resources at the local, state and federal levels
of the resettlement process are required to see efforts through to their desired outcome,
evaluating and refining the processes throughout the resettlement effort and well into the
refugees’ new lives in America.
The potential impact and benefits of coordinated effort are exemplified in the handling of a
Hepatitis A outbreak among some of the Wat Hmong after their U.S. arrival. Hepatitis A is a
communicable disease that is common to many areas of the world, including Southeast Asia.
Past infection with resultant immunity are so prevalent in refugee communities, Hepatitis A
was not included in initial screening requirements. Testing through a private provider in
Sheboygan uncovered the initial case of acute contagious infection in a child. Other health
departments began identifying cases as well and reported this information to the Division of
Public Health. In turn, the Division of Public Health developed screening guidelines and
transmitted the information statewide to other refugee screening providers. Health departments made tremendous efforts to screen school and family contacts, provide preventive
treatment to exposed susceptible and offer ongoing education. The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) was notified of the outbreak’s drain on local resources. As a
result of this communication, CDC worked with the Department of State to initiate a Hepatitis A
vaccination program in the Wat. Through communication, commitment, resources and time,
the system worked to limit disease in the community and to save hundreds of work hours.
Our identification of issues and recommendations seeks to maximize resources and quality of
life for individuals and our state as a whole.
•
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Medical Assistance provides health coverage for the refugee population beyond the initial
health screening. However, there is a lack of access to dental services in most areas of
the state for this population.

•

There are more than 165,000 Wisconsin residents whose limited English provides a barrier
to receiving adequate health care. Extensive research indicates that the quality and
outcomes of health care suffer unless qualified interpreters are provided when delivering
care to these individuals. The need for qualified medical interpreters and the cost of
providing this service is a further burden to the medical and dental providers. However,
these interpreters are is essential to the provision of culturally competent care. Medical
providers who receive federal funds are required to have qualified interpreters to allow
access to quality care. However, Medical Assistance does not provide any separate
reimbursement to cover these costs.

•

There is a need for ongoing health management and disease prevention beyond initial
screening. Individuals whose health costs are covered under Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA), which is available only for the first 8 months from arrival, are often older
individuals who may have ongoing health problems, but limited job abilities. They may be
left uninsured or underinsured and unable to obtain ongoing health services.

•

The large number of refugees arriving in a short time creates a burden on our public health
systems, both at the local and state level. This is concurrent with the public health
system’s efforts to control a pertussis outbreak. Again this impacts the local public health
providers, the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene (WSLH), and local physicians.

Recommendation D1: Increase access to dental care for Medical Assistance clients.
Increase access to dental care for Medical Assistance (MA) clients and increase the number of
dental providers accepting Medical Assistance clients. Effective solutions such as financial
incentives and loan forgiveness must be implemented to encourage dentists to accept MA.
Not only Hmong refugees, but all MA recipients are affected by the lack of MA dental
providers.
We appreciate the creation of the Governor’s Task Force to Improve Access to Oral Health and
urge that task force to consider Hmong refugees a priority. Attachment 5 contains a list of
action steps the Oral Health task force should implement that would enhance the oral health of
Hmong refugees and all Wisconsin residents that have limited access to oral health care.
Full implementation of the Governor’s KidsFirst Initiative would greatly benefit the Hmong
refugee population. In addition, the Governor could make a personal appeal to the dental
providers in communities impacted by the surge in Hmong refugees, asking them to donate
time to meet immediate needs (i.e. Wood, Marathon, Manitowoc, Sheboygan and La Crosse
counties). An example of such an existing service exists in Eau Claire, where, dental care
professionals annually offer their time to provide sealant and other preventive measures to the
children in some schools.
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Recommendation D2: Provide funding
for Medical Assistance reimbursement
for interpretive services for health and
dental health care.
The Department of Health and Family
Services should develop a budget
initiative to provide reimbursement for
interpretation when patients are receiving
a covered Medical Assistance benefit.
Federal funding for at least half of the
costs of such a program would be
available. The many states that have
initiated this service have substantially
improved care to Limited English patients.
Recommendation D3: Link refugees, especially those who are uninsured, with programs
and resources that promote health.
Case managers in resettlement agencies, W-2 agencies and Mutual Assistance Associations
should link refugees to supportive programs that can maximize health. This includes linkages
to federally qualified health care centers, SSI when appropriate, nutrition services, and other
health promotion/disease prevention services. In addition, provide funding to facilitate the
coordination of existing and/or development of new culturally appropriate health education
materials for providers and clients.
Recommendation D4: Build “surge capacity” into the public health system.
Continue support to local public health departments and other health providers through the
refugee screening funds and technical support. Build “surge capacity” into the public health
system to address multiple issues that may impact public health at any given time, including
contracting out certain public health services at those times when service demands exceed
health department capacity.

18

E. Family Strengthening
What is the Issue?
The Hmong refugees have and will encounter multiple family issues and stresses as they
transition into Wisconsin communities. The Task Force identified three key areas of need:
•
•
•

Initial and ongoing orientation and support for the refugee families and their sponsor
families.
Services and supports for the elderly refugees and refugees with disabilities.
Service to deal with changing family dynamics, including but not limited to domestic
violence, child abuse or neglect, youth gangs, truancy and school dropouts.

Refugees and their anchor families need to receive consistent information from all key players
in the resettlement process, including:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Voluntary Agencies (VOLAGs)
W – 2 Agencies
Income Maintenance Agencies
Public Health Departments
School/Education Partners
Mutual Assistance Associations (MAAs)

This process needs to start before the refugee family even arrives, so that agencies and
anchor families can work together to develop a common plan for resettlement.
With limited English speaking skills and schooling, the elderly and disabled refugees face
great challenges in the resettlement process. Because of age and/or disability, many will have
great difficulty in learning to speak English. This may make it impossible for them to obtain
citizenship within seven years of arrival. As a result, they are likely to lose their eligibility for
Supplemental Security Income. The elderly face an additional trial as federal funding for most
current Wisconsin refugee elderly programs will end December 2004.
Refugees with a disability may be eligible for long term support funding such as Community
Options or Community Integration programs but many counties have a waiting list for funds and
services. This will further stress the family, as caring for a family member with a disability may
conflict with the W 2 requirement to participate in employment and training.
Families will experience changes in roles and responsibilities based on gender and age.
Without education, assistance and support, families will possibly encounter problems with
depression, domestic violence, youth violence and gang involvement, truancy and dropouts
and child abuse and neglect. Victims of family violence are isolated both by their language
and cultural barriers and by their abusers.
A process that provides consistent initial and ongoing information and support to the new
refugees and sponsor families will assist in a more successful transition.
Hmong Task Force Report January 2005
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Recommendation E1: Provide comprehensive orientation to new families.
To ensure long term and consistent efforts, the Bureau of Migrant, Refugee and Labor Services
should add a staff position to develop a comprehensive orientation program to provide families with the necessary tools to experience positive change. This would include, but not be
limited to:
•
•
•
•

Conduct surveys to identify needs and available resources;
Create a repository of orientation curricula and bilingual materials so that local agencies
may provide a consistent orientation with minimal expense;
Create a checklist of documents, forms and material used by all agencies/organizations
involved in the resettlement process to minimize duplication; and
Create a statewide orientation program to ensure consistency and quality in how services
are provided by organizations that support the refugee families as they move through the
various systems. Examples include:
•

The anchor family receives information from the Refugee resettlement organization
prior to the arrival of the refugee family, which begins the coordination process with
other key players such as Economic Support and Wisconsin Works, Public Health, the
schools, the Hmong Mutual Assistance Associations;

•

The list of roles and responsibilities and process for contact/referral for county and
other services should be standardized and shared with other key players in the
system, including anchor families and Hmong Associations;

•

Prior to the arrival of the refugee family, a partnership of the key agencies would
arrange for a contact with the sponsor families to provide information on programs,
services, and application processes. This would help to coordinate financial and
non-financial resources, develop housing alternatives, assess the other
needs of the refugee family and develop resources to assist the sponsor family in
filling any gaps;

•

After arrival, the partnership would again work with the refugee and anchor family to
provide consistent information.

This process would address the immediate and long-term orientation needs for new arrivals
and their sponsor families, and address some the family dynamic and stress issues. As
sponsor families are often pulled in many directions, they would benefit from the assistance of
a more comprehensive orientation and support process. The fragmentation of the current
system at times conflicts with the sponsor families’ own work and family commitments.
The Bureau should consider a lead staff position in Madison and local staff who would gather
and compile the needed information and schedule the local orientations.
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Recommendation E2: Provide bilingual case management and interpretation services to
ensure that refugees (especially vulnerable elderly and disabled refugees) have access to
the same services as other residents.
The DWD should expand grants to provide bilingual case management services that will help
refugees access essential social and health services. These staff educate refugees about
available services and remove language barriers that prevent refugees from obtaining dental,
financial and other services.
Recommendation E3: Assist elderly and disabled refugees to obtain citizenship and
integrate into new communities.
Meet the citizenship and social integration needs of the elderly. The Bureau of Migrant,
Refugee and Labor Services should continue to seek funds for citizenship assistance
programs and evaluate their effectiveness in helping refugees achieve citizenship. In
addition, the Department of Health and Family Services and Area Agencies on Aging should
develop culturally and linguistically appropriate services to meet the long term care needs of
those with disabilities. Elderly residents who do not speak English face extraordinary levels
of isolation and difficulty in obtaining needed care. Community based organizations have
developed effective service models for these populations, but federal funding for them will not
continue. Area Agencies on Aging and other programs for the elderly must support and
integrate culturally appropriate services into the Aging programs throughout the state, including
meal programs which provide culturally appropriate meals, bilingual case management,
culturally and linguistically appropriate recreation programs for seniors, and bilingual access to
the long term care system.
Recommendation E4: Support continued funding for culturally and linguistically
competent services for victims of family violence.
Wisconsin has developed model programs
for minimizing family violence and
providing safety and security for refugee
families which are experiencing family
violence. These programs utilize the
means of supporting families and
controlling violence that are used by both
cultures. TANF funding to maintain these
programs must be provided in order to
assure that victims have access to lifesaving services.

Hmong Task Force Report January 2005

21

F. Mental Health
What is the Issue?
The Mental Health Committee of the Governor’s Hmong Resettlement Task Force was
formed due to concerns generated from the experience of the first wave of Hmong
refugees, as well as studies of those refugees residing at Wat Tham Krabok before
relocation to the United States. Many Hmong refugees experienced the loss of loved
ones, the loss of their own freedom, severe economic dislocation, starvation, and
torture. These traumas led to significant mental health problems, including severe
depression, post traumatic stress syndrome, anxiety and suicide ideation.
It is very difficult for Hmong refugees to understand the Western concept of mental health
and even more difficult to reap the benefits of mental health services. For this reason the
history of traditional therapy provided by English-only speaking therapists through
translators has not provided encouraging outcomes. Both the therapist and translator in
this situation have enormous cultural and linguistic hurdles to overcome to deliver a
quality service.
In the best of all worlds there would be an army of trained bilingual/bicultural mental
health professionals who could provide meaningful explanations and services to this
population. Unfortunately, three decades after the first wave of Hmong migration from
Southeast Asia there is only limited bilingual/bicultural mental health infrastructure that the
new Hmong arrivals can access.
In fact, there is only a very small group of certified therapists available throughout the
state to meet the needs of tens of thousands of Hmong. These therapists are the remnant
of an infrastructure first started by grants through the Office of Refugee Services within the
last ten years. With the reduction of financial support from the federal government over
the past two years, the development of this modest infrastructure was not only halted but
also reversed, with fewer Hmong mental health resources in the state today than there
were three years ago.
The Mental Health Committee spent substantial time and energy discussing problems
and solutions, considering long and short-term needs of the new arrivals and best
strategies to meet the emerging needs of Wisconsin’s Hmong Community. These have
been encompassed in a single recommendation.
The dominant need identified by the Mental Health Committee is the development and
maintenance of culturally competent mental health services throughout the state.
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Recommendation F1: Develop and sustain linguistically and culturally competent mental
health services.
The State of Wisconsin will offer up to seven mental health grants for seven areas of the state
most affected by new arrivals. The purpose of the grants will be to develop and maintain the
infrastructure necessary for community-based, bilingual/bicultural mental health services. The
grants will be at least $50,000 per agency each year, for an annual budget of $350,000.
Based on the discussion of the Mental Health Committee the grants are to include the following
service components:
•

a Community Mental Health Education program;

•

a culturally adapted Mental Health Assessment Tool;

•

additional financial support from Medical Assistance, insurance and 51.42 Board funding;

•

bi-lingual, bi-cultural case-management and treatment programs; and

•

cultural competency training for mental health service providers.

The grant will also require establishment of an Advisory Committee for each geographic
region, which includes Hmong leadership, to monitor and report on the progress of mental
health infrastructure development to the State of Wisconsin. The Department of Health and
Family Services will monitor and support the development of these programs, and evaluate
their effectiveness. The DHFS will also provide technical assistance to grantees to help them
access Medical Assistance and 51.42 board funding for clinical services.
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Conclusion:
In addition to the specific charges stated
by Governor Doyle, the Task Force
hopes that the work we have done and
are sharing in this report fulfills the
following objectives:
•

Create a network throughout
Wisconsin for “best practices” in
working with Hmong refugees.

•

Coordinate the efforts of private and public agencies to respond effectively to the
needs of the Hmong refugees.

•

Help all citizens of Wisconsin build community in response to the needs of any group
of people or individuals who need it.

•

Ensure that policy makers, agency directors, managers, and others who are in the
position of influencing how staff and other resources are allocated use these
recommendations to guide the decisions they make.

•

Ensure that policy makers at all levels include the Hmong community as equal
partners in the further planning, implementation and evaluation of these
recommendations as a whole.

The Task Force gratefully acknowledges the support of Governor Jim Doyle, Senator
Feingold, Senator Kohl, Congressman Obey,subcommittee members, and all of the
citizens in our communities for their efforts in welcoming new Hmong refugees to the
state of Wisconsin. All of these efforts will enhance and improve community building for
all citizens in our great state. We wish to specifically thank DWD for allowing their staff
members to join this very important endeavor. The Task Force on Hmong Resettlement
would not have been successful without the effort and commitment of Susan Levy and Ying
Lee.
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5
47
1,941

13
42
73
21
4
4
147
62
276
468
89
82
252
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Actual Arrivals
as of 12/0/6/04
Individuals
221
64
27
67
101
46
4
6
244
129
427
764
169
136
297
6
37
67
3,190

Estimated by State
Department Total
Individuals

Attachment 1 -- Estimated Hmong Arrivals and Needs

Brown
Calumet
Chippewa
Dane
Eau Claire
Fond du Lac
Jefferson
Juneau
La Crosse
Manitowoc
Marathon
MIlwaukee
Outagamie
Portage
Sheboygan
St. Croix
Washington
Wood
TOTAL

County

46
9
5
13
23
10
1
2
50
26
90
157
41
30
70
1
8
15
682

Estimated by State
Department Total
Families

Estimated Hmong Arrivals and Needs

88
26
11
27
40
18
2
2
98
52
171
306
68
54
119
2
15
27
1,276

Estimated 40% of
Individuals Need
Adult ESL
41
8
5
12
21
9
1
2
45
23
81
141
37
27
63
1
7
14
614

Estimated 90% of
Families Need
Housing Assistance

Subcommittee Members and Areas of Need

Education
(Early Childhood, K-12, ELL, Future of
Children for College Education, Tuition,
Services to 14-16 Year Olds, and
Adult ESL)

Employment
(Job Development, Economic
Development, Basic Skills Training)

Sub-Committee Chairs and Members
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Nell Anderson, Chair, Wausau School District
Boungning Her, Milwaukee Area Technical College
Mary Ann Jackson, Wisconsin Technical College System
Sharon Hunter, Department of Public Instruction
Hoyu Sayaovong, Hmong First Baptist Church
Shwaw Vang, Madison School Board
Bee Xiong, Green Bay Police Department
(*)Carolyn Brady, University of Wisconsin-River Falls
(*)Bonnie Dockry, Department of Public Instruction
(*)Linda St Pierre, Sheboygan School District

•

Thai Vue, Chair, La Crosse Area Hmong Mutual
Assistance Association
Phyllis Bermingham, Wausau Area Hmong Mutual Association
Joe Vang, Fox Valley Job Service
Shoua Xiong, Lao Family Community, Inc.
(*)Ying Lee, Department of Workforce Development
(*)Elizabeth Mahloch, Sheboygan County
Economic Support /W-2
(*)Lesley Salas, Milwaukee Private Industry Council

•
•
•
•
•
•
Family Strengthening
(Domestic Abuse Prevention and Education,
Bilingual, Bicultural Services and Interpretation,
Services to the Elderly Population, Safety
Issues, Supervision of Children, Cultural
Orientation to the New Families and their
Sponsors/Anchor Relatives, Teen Parents,
Childcare).

•
•
•
•
•

Ker Vang, Chair, Hmong Association of Green Bay
Boungning Her, Milwaukee Area Technical College
ThajYing Lee, United Refugee Services of Wisconsin
Ann Wondergem, Sheboygan County Health and
Human Services
Christa Xiong, Xiong & Associates

Health and Dental Care
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Melissa Borth, Chair, ThedaCare At Home
Susan Gundlach, Lutheran Social Services of Wisconsin
Cheryl McIlquham, Department of Health and Family Services
(*)Jean Beinemann, Sheboygan County Health and
Human Services
(*)Karen Fink, US Department of Health and Human Services
(*)Melee Thao, Marathon County Health Department
(*)Savitri Tsering, Department of Heath and Family Services

Attachment 2—Subcommittee Members and Areas of Need (formed to discuss and
strategize in-depth issues identified by the Task Force as a whole)

Sub-Committee

Mental Health
(Bilingual, Bicultural Services)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

ChaSong Yang, Chair, Hmong Mutual Assistance
Association of Sheboygan
Dan Idzikowski, Catholic Charities, Diocese of La Crosse
John Medinger, Mayor City of La Crosse
Yee Moua, Wisconsin Housing and Economic Development Authority
Jim Schramm, Mayor City of Sheboygan
Peter Yang, Wausau Area Hmong Mutual Association
(*)Mitch Birkey, Sheboygan County Economic Support/W-2
(*)Dave Coady, Department of Transportation
(*)Susan Levy, Department of Workforce Development
(*)Keith A. Pamperin, Green Bay Housing Authority
(*)Diane Poole, Department of Transportation
(*)Luann Scheer, ADVOCAP, Inc.
(*)Judy Wilcox, Department of Commerce

Andrew Benedetto, Chair, Children’s Service Society of Wisconsin
Phyllis Bermingham, Wausau Area Hmong Mutual Association
ThajYing Lee, United Refugee Services of Wisconsin
Joe Vang, Fox Valley Job Service
Shwaw Vang, Madison School Board
Peter Yang, Wausau Area Hmong Mutual Association
(*)Tom Dodge, Sheboygan Mental Health Program
(*)Karen Fink, US Department of Health and Human Services
(*)Kay Heilmel, Outagamie County Department of Human Services
(*)Christine Wolf, Department of Health and Family Services

Attachment 2—Subcommittee Members and Areas of Need (formed to discuss and
strategize in-depth issues identified by the Task Force as a whole)

Housing and Transportation
(Affordable Housing, Housing Conditions, •
Inspections, Safe Housing, Housing
Assistance Programs. Etc.)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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28
73.2%
X
84.3%
50.4%

69.0%

3,814,620
1,049,456
3,367,835
2,015,522
2,734,925
134,311
X

43.7%
X
48.4%
27.2%

52.3%

73,185
76,253
36,864
20,703
40,548
4,646
X

55.5%
X
47.9%
25.8%

59.3%

17,213
14,234
6,451
3,475
8,301
815
X

Homeownership (Live in “owned home”)
School Enrollment (K-12)
HS Graduate or Higher
Some College or Completed Degree (18 and Older)
Employed (16 and Older)
Unemployed (16 and Older)
Labor Force Participation Rate (16 and Older)

Attachment 3 - Census Data Concerning the Hmong

8.7%
451,538

37.8%

31,071

25.9%

7,928

X
$43,791

X

$32,076

X

Poverty

$35,898

X
65.0%
36.1
3,475,878

X
31.9%

16.3
54,258

X
31.4%

15.9
9,750

Median Age (years)
Older than Age 25
Median Household Income in 1999

49.4%
50.6%

2,648,363
2,715,312

50.6%
49.4%

85,900
84,059

50.2%
49.8%

Total WI Population
Percent
Number

Hmong in the U.S
Percent
Number

15,566
15,444

Hmong in WI
Percent
Number
Male
Female

Hmong Alone, No Combination of Other Races

Census Data Concerning the Hmong

English as a Second Language Initiative
Based on geographic distribution that places students in various communities within a district
we anticipate the need for 44 ADDITIONAL ESL course sections of 30 students each. Thirty
students is a high teacher/student ratio but even at this rate the total amount it would cost to
provide all of the necessary instruction would be in excess of $1million. This recommendation is for additional funding for 23 sections serving 690 adult learners. If $600,000 is allocated to support these ESL sections, an additional $469,000 would be required to support
the overall need. The Wisconsin Technical College System has applied for a grant with the
Office of Refugee Resettlement that, if approved, would satisfy the remaining need.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

These classes will offer at least 15-20 hours of instruction per week with 30 students per
section depending on the location.
A minimum of 50% if the instruction will be experience based so that students can learn
language skills at the same time they are experiencing community orientation activities
related to health care, public schools, finances, transportation, etc.
Career education and job skills will be provided and will also be interwoven across the
curriculum.
Classes will be scheduled to accommodate the majority of the students’ schedules.
Classes will be offered at a convenient location.
Classes will have computer and video technology available.
Classes will be taught by professional certified instructors.
There is a need to emphasize teaching parents the skills that will help them be the main
supporter for their children’s education. We need to keep the parents influence dominant
in the families.

2. Teachers and students require books and materials. It is an objective of this project to
provide the new arrivals with classrooms that have adequate learning materials to support
their goal of learning English quickly and well. All students will be pre and post tested using
the BEST PLUS standardized test. This is a nationally standardized test and approved by
the Department of Education. It must be:
•
•
•

administered individually and while an excellent assessment tool, it consumes quite a lot
of staff time which brings the cost up.
Lower level language learners need to have texts that are consumable.
Experiential learning requires a few additional resources which are very cost effective.

Attachment 4—English as a Second Language Initiative

PROPOSED ACTIVITIES:
1.
Adult English as a Second Language Programs will add 23 new course sections
specifically for the new Hmong or Somali Bantu people. New refugees’ language needs are
different from other ESL students and they will make much better progress in classes
designed specifically for them.
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3. Volunteers, specialists and teachers will require some training in order to address the
specific needs of these refugees. Professional development activities would include helping
staff understand the cultures and recent living experiences of their new students. They would
work with trainers to learn research based strategies that best suite these particular students.
•

This project would provide four regional trainings for all instructional and para-professional
staff in these ESL programs.
This project would provide training for literacy volunteers to prepare them to work with
these new refugees.

•

Local programs have met or exceeded their federal/state performance standards in each of the
prior two years. They have implemented personal education plans for students and learn each
student’s goals. Classes are provided at the main campus, at outreach campuses and in the
community at sites to accommodate access for all students. All CBO’s have 5.01(C)3 status
that is verified for funding through this agency and have been reviewed by an on-site review
team.
BUDGET JUSTIFICATION
This is a statewide project recommendation and will fund several different local colleges and CBO’s. Thus the salary for a
part time instructor is an average.
Cost per ESL class section of 30 beginning level students
1.
Staff Costs
$25,000
Part time instructor, including fringe
$25/hr X 15 hours per week x 52 weeks + fringe
2.

Classroom resources:
Standardized testing
Books and other materials
@ $21 per student

$900
$270
$630

Total cost of instructor and materials per course section:
Total cost of 23 course sections
4 regional workshops @ $825 ea.
$3,300
Volunteer training @$1,000
$1,000

$25,900
$595,700

Related Professional Development:

$4,300
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ORGANIZATIONAL PROFILES
The Wisconsin Technical College System and the Adult Basic Education Programs have a long
and well documented history of culturally responsive services to refugees and immigrants for
more than 30 years. In support of ESL students the System provides support services for
special needs, financial aid for students seeking to attend post secondary education, counseling and coordination with other community services. Faculty are certified based on their
academic and work histories. A curriculum has been developed to correspond to the six
performance levels of the National Reporting System. The System Office will be the project
recipient and coordinator. Sub-contracts will be made to nine technical college districts. At that
level the Dean or Coordinator of the Adult Basic Education Program will be responsible for the
management of the funds and compliance with the project goals and reporting. In Milwaukee
Silver Spring Neighborhood Center and the Indo-Chinese Learning Center of Neighborhood
House will also be direct project recipients.

Attachment 5—Action Steps that Enhance the Oral Health of Hmong
Refugees and other Wisconsin Residents
Action steps listed below are in accord with recommendations made by the Governor’s
KidsFirst Initiative, the State Health Plan and coalitions of public health organizations. These
steps would enhance the oral health of Hmong refugees and all Wisconsin residents that have
limited access to oral health care. These recommendations will maximizing resources for all
and address the Hmong Resettlement Task Force’s concern for the ongoing health management
and disease prevention for refugees beyond the initial refugee health screening.
1. Support the utilization of dental hygienists to the fullest extent of their licensed scope.
Services include screening, triage, prevention services (age-appropriate fluoride treatments
and dental sealants) and case management for follow-up treatment referral.

2. Support DORL and DHFS statutory interpretations (s.447) and MA Updates that enable dental
hygiene services to be incorporated into settings such as health departments and schools.
Rationale: Since there is a limited pool of dentists participating in referral, these interpretations enable dental hygienists to screen, determine the need for and provide prevention
services such as fluoride treatments, dental sealants and referral, in schools and local
health departments on an ongoing basis without a a dentist’s prescription. It is a wise use
of licensed workforce since dentists are needed to provide more complicated dental
diagnosis, relief of pain/infection and treatment of oral diseases.
3. Consistent with the Governor’s KidsFirst Initiative, support direct reimbursement for dental
hygienists under medical assistance.
Rationale: Since dental hygienists can practice as independent contractors, this enables
health departments and schools that are not HealthCheck agencies to contract with a dental
hygienist for these services.
4. Promote training health department and other health care providers to provide oral
screening, triage and age appropriate fluoride treatments (fluoride varnishes for infants and
toddlers) As of February 2004, fluoride varnish is an MA covered service for physicians,
nurses and dental hygienists.
Rationale: Dental caries is a transmissible bacterial infection (mother to child). The
average age of infectivity is around age 2, earlier than most dentists see children. Early
childhood cavities are preventable with early intervention (screening, age appropriate
topical fluorides and parent education). Primary health care providers see infants and
toddlers for well baby examinations, an ideal time to provide these services. The training is
provided by DFS and also includes evaluating maternal oral health to help promote healthy
birth outcomes:
http://dhfs.wisconsin.gov/health/Oral_Health/oralhealthmanual.htm

Attachment 5—Action Steps that Enhance the Oral Health of Hmong Refugees
and other Wisconsin Residents

Rationale: Since dental treatment resources are limited, triage to prioritize urgent and early
treatment needs. Prevention services such as dental sealants provide physical barriers,
strengthen the resistance of the child, avert future disease and they are cost effective.
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For more information
go to
http://dwd.wisconsin.gov/hrtf/default.htm

